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THE FEBRUARY 1946 CLASSICAL JOURNAL

Achilles—Bare of Foot?

by Frederick M. Combellack

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Did the Homeric heroes wear their shoes in the house?
Or did they put them on only when out for a walk?

Achilles—Bare of Foot?

by Frederick M. Combella

IT may be stated at the outset that the purpose of these remarks is to decrease knowledge, or, at least, to decrease confident certainty about a detail of our knowledge. I think that a short re-examination of the few passages in which Homer happens to mention shoes¹ will strongly suggest that the confident statements which are made on this subject in commentaries and handbooks are really not supported by the evidence of the Homeric poems.

The orthodox view about the use of shoes in Homeric times is set forth simply by Seymour in his *Life in the Homeric Age*.² He tells us that probably most persons went barefoot during the greater part of the year, and in particular remarks that shoes "are not worn within the house." He repeats this last statement on p. 202 and there gives a reference to *Odyssey* 1.96, of which more anon. It is with this detail of Homeric private life that I am here concerned. I have read somewhere, though I am now unable to recover the

reference, the explicit statement that the habits of the Homeric Greeks were in this respect like those of the modern Japanese.³ If any doubt can be cast upon this view, this is as good a time as any to make the effort.

The notion that the Homeric Greeks did not wear shoes at home is apparently of very respectable antiquity, widespread, and nowadays very rarely even qualified. Two hundred years ago S. Feith in his *Antiquitatum Homeriarum Libri IV*⁴ remarked that Homer mentioned shoes in connection with some of his characters: . . . cum aliquo egredierentur. Nimirum veteres illi non erant semper calceati, uti hodie fit; sed cum essent exituri, potissimum suscepto longiori itinere.

Perhaps the longest discussion of shoes is in J. H. Voss' *Mythologische Briefe*,⁵ but he sheds little light on our particular problem. Voss held that in Homer's day wearing shoes was "a privilege of the nobility" (131); that, in general, shoes were looked upon as ornaments, though now and then they might be put on for some immediate practical purpose, as when Eumaeus wears them in Book xvi of the *Odyssey* for his walk to town. The vagueness of his treatment is well indicated by the statement in the "Inhalt" on p. xv, "people in the earliest period [of antiquity] went with shoes on only for ornamental reasons or because of some necessity; otherwise they went barefoot." Strictly speaking, one could make such a statement with reasonable accuracy about modern habits.

E. L. Cammann⁶ devotes most of his re-

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marks about shoes to refuting the theory that the Homeric heroes did not wear shoes in battle; he does, however, say, "The Homeric heroes did not customarily wear footwear in the house; they went barefoot."

The account of J. B. Friedreich⁷ is little more than an abridgement and paraphrase of Voss. His relevant sentence is, "The use of some form of footwear was restricted by preference to life out-of-doors."

After Friedreich, qualifications by means of "customarily," "by preference," and the like disappear, and, in keeping with the familiar "progress" of handbooks, the statements become categorical. Buchholz,⁸ who relies heavily on Voss and Cammann, tells us, "In connection with footwear, it is to be noted that people went barefoot in the house, and covered the feet only when they proposed to embark on a journey or, for that matter, on any ordinary outing, or to join in battle."

T. T. Timayenis⁹ declares, "During the Homeric period no shoes were used in the house. Sandals of hide were worn in the streets only."

Guhl and Koner¹⁰ arrange their brief remarks in such a way that they are actually misleading: "The Greeks found nothing startling in showing themselves barefoot in the house or even in the street. Just as the Oriental even today puts aside his slippers or shoes upon his entry to the house, and changes to his stocking-feet, so also the Greek put aside his footwear were he to enter his own or another's house. Thus, already in Homer, a man, when he left the house, first laced gleaming sandals beneath his feet, and this custom still held good in later times." The unwary might well conclude from this that there is evidence in Homer for this parallel between modern Oriental and ancient Greek practice. Actually, there is none.

Pauly-Wissowa, in their articles *Schuh* and *Sandalia*, are more concerned with the form of the shoes than their use, though they do tell us (under *Schuh*), "In Homeric times the Greeks customarily wore footwear only upon going out of the house," and (under *Sandalia*), "In Homer the frequently-named *πέδιλα* are of course to be understood as sandals, since they are called *ὑποδήματα* and were tied be-

neath the feet when the dwelling-place was left."

The editors are usually occupied with more important problems, but now and then they reveal their acceptance of the orthodox view. For example, Loewe¹¹ on *Odyssey* 2.4, "*πέδιλα* calceamenta, talaria pedibus subligari solebant, cum aut ex domo egrediendum aut iter faciendum esset." Koch¹² on *Odyssey* 16.154, "*ἔλκετο χεῖροσι πέδιλα*, because, following the custom of the Heroic Age, he had taken off his sandals in the house." Van Leeuwen¹³ on *Odyssey* 15.550, "*nudis igitur pedibus in navi, ut domi, Telemachus sedit.*"

Shoes in the House?

Clearly, then, the view expressed by Seymour that the Homeric Greeks did not wear shoes at home is widely prevalent. Do the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* really justify such confident assertions? Shoes are mentioned by Homer nineteen times,¹⁴ and one might well think that these instances should be sufficient to permit definite conclusions. Actually, nearly all the references are of such a sort that they do little more than make it clear that shoes were known in Homeric times. (The indefiniteness and insignificance of these references to shoes is well illustrated by the fact that even the Dissectors, ever ready to magnify trifles, have not been able to find here much support for their ingenious theorizings. Geddes¹⁵ does note that *καλὰ πέδιλα* occur only once in the "Achilleid" [and there they belong to Hera], while they are met with four times in the "Ulyssean books" of the *Iliad*, and seven times in the *Odyssey*.) Very rarely does the mention of shoes occur in a context which will enable one to draw any conclusion whatever about the circumstances under which shoes are worn.

First there is a group of passages like *Odyssey* 1.96, cited by Seymour as a support for his statement that shoes are not worn in the house. In this opening scene of the *Odyssey* we are told that the gods (except Poseidon) are gathered in the hall of Zeus (1.26f.). When their discussion ends, Athena binds on beautiful sandals and sets off for Ithaca. At first sight this seems definite and decisive: while sitting at home the gods were barefoot,

but when one of them goes out she puts on her shoes. If we read a line or so beyond 96, however, we get some additional information which reveals that the passage is not so simple as it seemed. We learn that these shoes are not only ambrosial (whatever that may have meant to Homer) and golden, as befits a god, but that they carry Athena over land and sea as fast as the wind.¹⁶ In short, these are magic sandals used by gods for a particular purpose. That Athena uses them for her trip to Ithaca can not be taken as decisive proof that she was barefoot before; still less does it justify the conclusion that a mortal regularly went barefoot in his hall and put on his shoes to walk to the market place. (It is agreed, of course, that in general the customs of the gods on Olympus reproduce those of mortals on the earth.) These magic sandals are also worn by Hermes for his trips to Calypso (*Odyssey* 5.44) and to Priam (*Iliad* 24.340).

Shoes and Social Position

About one-third of the nineteen instances can be dismissed briefly since they obviously contain no information on our problem. (1) In four passages in the *Odyssey* (15.369, 16.80, 18.361, 21.341) a character is given or promised what is apparently a complete outfit of clothing, and shoes are included, but nothing is said about how or when they are worn. Incidentally, the fact that the characters involved in these instances are a slave and a beggar seems to me decisive against the view (found for example in Voss and Buchholz) that the wearing of shoes was in Homeric times something of a social distinction. In the *Odyssey*, where alone lowly characters play anything of a role, shoes are mentioned fourteen times. Twice they are the magic sandals of the gods; the remaining twelve instances are divided socially into two equal parts: six times shoes are mentioned in connection with a slave or a beggar, and six times they appear on a member of the nobility. (In one of these cases [13.225] the wearer is really Athena in disguise, but she looks like a nobleman's son, 223). There is no shred of evidence for any such statement as that made by Buchholz,¹⁷ "in general sandals were worn only by more distinguished and

important characters," though we might reasonably assume that the nobles did wear shoes somewhat more regularly than did the slaves. (2) When Athena, disguised as a youth, appears before Odysseus soon after he has awakened in Ithaca, she is wearing shoes (13.225), but we learn nothing about when she put them on. (3) In 14.23, Eumaeus is portrayed working on shoes, but there is no information about the circumstances under which they will be worn.

Telemachus' Shoes

The remaining instances are somewhat more illuminating. (1) 15.550—Telemachus puts on his shoes before setting out for the swineherd's hut. But here there is no antithesis between indoor and outdoor habits. Telemachus has been outdoors all along. He has just participated in the landing of a boat, and a meal on the beach. Even a modern, habituated to the wearing of shoes during most of his waking hours, might well not wear them under such circumstances. Commentators on this passage tell us that Telemachus also went barefoot on the boat.¹⁸ Maybe he did, but we cannot be sure about it, because Homer never says or implies anything about the practice aboard ship. In any case, this passage proves nothing about the usage at home.

(2) It is in *Odyssey* 16.154 that we find what I think is the only account in Homer which might be felt to offer even a slight support for the orthodox view. Here Eumaeus, who has been talking in his hut with Odysseus and Telemachus, puts on shoes to go to town. Here for the first time we have a character pretty certainly barefoot at home putting on shoes before going out. But the passage is not so decisive as it at first appears, because the circumstances are abnormal. Odysseus and Eumaeus have sat up very late the night before. Dawn comes almost as soon as they have gone to bed. They have just had time to get up, light a fire, send the other herdsmen to their tasks, and are getting their breakfast ready when Telemachus appears. Surely, in a situation of this kind a certain amount of dishabille is only natural. Under similar circumstances today many a man

would be likely to be caught wearing only slippers on his feet. The fact that Eumaeus has not yet got around to putting on his shoes on this particular morning can hardly prove that he regularly went barefoot at home. Moreover, even if a slave regularly did go barefoot in a hut in the hills, that would not permit us to draw the same conclusion about the practice of the nobles in their halls.

(3) *Iliad* 14.186—Hera puts on her shoes as part of the costume in which she arrays herself before setting out to beguile Zeus. Though she does soon depart on a journey, there is no statement that these are the familiar magic sandals. But in any case the passage can prove nothing about going barefoot at home, because the first thing Hera does to prepare for her great enterprise is to take a bath (with ambrosia, of course), and she could hardly be expected to keep her shoes on then.

(4) The narrative in the end of Book xvi of the *Odyssey* and the beginning of xvii is too compressed for our purpose. In 16.481 the men in the hut of Eumaeus lie down to rest. In 17.1-2 we are told abruptly that when the dawn appeared Telemachus put on his shoes and took his staff to go to town, and after a brief conversation he sets out. It is not clear how soon after getting up Telemachus left the hut; if we take Homer's account *au pied de la lettre* he left almost at once, and we are justified in concluding that he put on his shoes as soon as he got up. At least we can say that there is no positive indication that he spent any considerable time in the hut barefoot. (It is not necessary to assume that Telemachus stopped to have breakfast before leaving the hut. Cf. Seymour, pp. 208f.)

(5) We now come to the final group, six passages in which a man puts on his shoes when he gets out of bed: *Odyssey* 2.4, 4.309, 20.126; *Iliad* 2.44, 10.22, 132. (Probably *Odyssey* 17.2, just discussed, should also be included in this group.) This is the most common situation and accounts for about one-third of all the passages in which shoes are mentioned and about half of all those in which shoes are worn. This fact alone should, in the absence of good evidence to the contrary, create a strong presumption that it was a common and quite probably regular practice

in Homeric times to put on one's shoes when rising.¹⁹ In five of the six passages, however, the evidence is rendered dubious for our present purpose, because the characters go out immediately or almost immediately after getting up. In fact, Nestor (*Iliad* 10.132) is actually sleeping out of doors, and it is quite possible that Agamemnon (10.22) is also. The one remaining instance (*Odyssey* 4.309) is not open to this objection, and is reasonably clear proof that the common statement that the Homeric Greeks went barefoot at home is not in accord with the facts of the *Odyssey*. In this passage Menelaus puts on his shoes, leaves his room, and then holds a long conversation with his guest Telemachus. Homer does not say just where this takes place; possibly just outside the door (cf. 3.404ff., where Nestor, immediately after getting up, goes and sits in his regular place just outside the doors). But wherever the conversation may have been held, Menelaus is clearly at home, and knew that he was going to spend the morning at home; he obviously did not put on his shoes because he thought he was going on a journey or even for a walk to the market place.²⁰ That the conversation may well have taken place in the open air, in the courtyard, and not strictly under the roof of the house, does not materially affect the argument. The distinction which is implied when it is not actually stated in the orthodox accounts is between "at home" and "abroad." We have here in *Odyssey* 4 an unmistakable example of a Homeric character putting on his shoes when he dresses for a morning at home. This and the other instances in which characters are portrayed putting on shoes when they get up in the morning seem to me to indicate clearly enough the regular Homeric practice. It is probably true that usually the men at least would very soon leave the house for the market place, and this may well be the reason why it became habitual to put on one's shoes when getting up. But to judge by the crude nature of Odysseus' palace, with its dirt-floored hall and filthy courtyard in which swine, goats, and cattle are not only temporarily kept on occasion (20.164-189),²¹ but also slaughtered and prepared for eating (2.300), in which geese roam (19.536-40, as they do in the

splendid home of Helen and Menelaus, 15.161-2), and in which manure is apparently heaped until it is needed (17.297ff.), the Homeric Greeks certainly had ample reason for wearing shoes at home.

Taking Off Shoes

If the Greeks in Homer's time regularly put their shoes on early in the morning, they probably did not take them off again when they came home later in the day. Nitzsch²² believed that the practice with shoes was the same as that with cloaks, and that both were laid aside when one came indoors for any time. But although Homer tells us on occasion that the cloaks were laid aside (e.g. *Odyssey* 17.179), he never makes any such statement about shoes. It is hard to believe that if people regularly took their shoes off when coming into a house Homer would have consistently failed to mention it, especially since he often describes people entering a house, and depicts many extended indoor scenes. This is, of course, dubious ground. If it was a universal practice, Homer's audience would assume it and perhaps even visualize it whether it was mentioned or not. In modern novels the authors do not need to tell us when a character goes into a house that he took his hat off or that he put it on when he went out again.²³ Here, as so often, Homer could have made everything clear and easy for us if he had only been able to conceive of the degree of our ignorance. How simple this little problem would be if Homer had only happened to mention that the suitors put on their shoes before leaving Odysseus' palace at night, or that Telemachus, after an evening at home, removed his shoes when he undressed for bed, or that Telemachus and Pisistratus, or Eumaeus and Odysseus, removed their shoes on entering a house. But, oddly enough, no character in Homer ever under any circumstances is said to take off his shoes. On the other hand, no person, I believe, is ever specifically said to be barefooted.²⁴ It is a plausible guess that in those relatively simple times, and in a climate presumably dry and sunny, shoes would not seem so important as they do in most of the regions of this country, and going barefoot both in-

doors and out may have been comparatively common.

This review of Homer's references to the use of shoes reveals, I think, first, that the evidence is meager and seldom if ever detailed or explicit enough to enable us to draw any conclusion with complete confidence; secondly, that there is really no support in Homer for the frequent and confident assertion that the Homeric Greeks regularly did not wear shoes at home; thirdly, that what evidence there is suggests that they were just as likely to wear shoes at home as abroad. In this matter of shoes, then, as so often in Homeric studies, if we are willing to take the trouble to return to Homer himself, we find that the statements prevalent in standard handbooks and commentaries not only go beyond the evidence, but often run counter to it.

I have made no effort to go into the more complicated subject of the use of shoes in historical times in Greece, because even if clear and detailed information about the practice then were available, we could not tell how similar this was to the practice in Homeric times. There is a discussion of the literary evidence for the fifth and fourth centuries by A. A. Bryant.²⁵ The first section of this study is largely devoted to the question of when shoes were worn. There are a number of references in Xenophon, Plato, Plutarch, and others to barefoot Spartans, philosophers, and other odd characters; Bryant rightly remarks on these, "the very fact that these are so cited, not to mention the other idiosyncrasies of costume and custom attributed to each, marks them as exceptions to a rule almost universal." Bryant then continues, "As few men went barefoot all the time, so there were times when most men put off their shoes. Indoors, whether at meals or in bed or at the bath, or at exercise in gymnasium or palaestra, men never wore anything on their feet." It should not surprise anyone to learn that the Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries did not wear their shoes in bed or while bathing, and I have no doubts about the habits of the Homeric heroes in this respect. The usage in athletics is not relevant

to our subject, and, in any case, we know nothing about it for Homeric times. Whether or not the Homeric Greeks took off their shoes at meals we have no evidence to enable us to decide. We can say that Homer never gives us any hint that they did so,²⁶ and there was plenty of opportunity, since there is a

good deal of eating in Homer. While Bryant seems confident that the later Greek men did not wear shoes indoors, he cites evidence for their absence only during eating, sleeping, and bathing; the average Athenian male, it is true, would probably not be likely to be home much for any other purposes.

NOTES

ED. NOTE: Quotations in the text from the German have been translated into English in the editorial office.

¹ I shall use throughout this discussion the word shoes as a convenient generic term for "Fussbekleidung" without implying anything about form, extent, or nature.

² New York, 1907, pp. 170f. (There is no change in the 1914 edition.)

³ Cf. the more general comparison quoted below (see note 10) from Guhl & Koner.

⁴ Editio nova, Argentorati, 1743, p. 331.

⁵ 2nd. ed. Vol. 1, Stuttgart, 1827, pp. 127-133.

⁶ *Vorschule zu der Iliade und Odyssee* (Leipzig, 1829) 332.

⁷ *Die Realien in der Iliade und Odyssee*, 2nd. ed. (Erlangen, 1856) 242.

⁸ *Die Homerischen Realien*, Vol. II, Part II (Leipzig, 1883) 278f.

⁹ *Greece in the Times of Homer* (New York, 1885) 236.

¹⁰ *Leben der Griechen und Römer*, 6th ed. by R. Engelmann (Berlin, 1893) 306.

¹¹ *Homeri Odyssea Graece* ed. Edvardus Loewe, Lipsiae, 1828.

¹² *Homer's Odyssee*, viertes Heft, Hannover, 1872. Cf. also his note on 15.550.

¹³ *Odyssea* ed. J. Van Leeuwen, Lugduni Batavorum, 1917.

¹⁴ *πῆδιλα* (17) *Iliad* 2.44, 10.22, 132, 14.186, 24.340; *Odyssey* 1.96, 2.4, 4.309, 5.44, 13.225, 14.23, 15.550, 16.80, 154, 17.2, 20.126, 21.341; *ὑποδήματα*, 15.369, 18.361.

¹⁵ *Problem of the Homeric Poems* (London, 1878) 165.

¹⁶ The Dissectors sometimes attack these lines immediately following 96 as interpolations. Cf., e.g., Bolling, *External Evidence for Interpolation in Homer* (Oxford, 1925) 217 ff.

¹⁷ *Homerischen Realien*, Vol. II, Part II (Leipzig, 1883) 279.

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. Ameis-Hentze (numerous editions, published by Teubner of Leipzig), "auf dem Schiffe ging er barfuss," Hayman (*Odyssey*, 3 Vols., London, 1866ff.), on this passage and also on 16.154, and Van Leeuwen (see note 13). J. Terpstra (*Antiquitas Homerica*, Leyden, 1831, p. 175), even goes so far as to say, "navi peregre profectus Telemachus a pedibus quoque *πῆδιλα* solverat, quae redux ad Eumaeum abiturus *ὑπὸ ποσσὶν ἐδήσαστο*." The first part of this statement is a mere

guess; Homer does not say a word about Telemachus having taken off his shoes on the ship or anywhere else. The same guess is stated as a fact by Nitzsch (*Erklärende Anmerkungen zu Homer's Odyssee*, Vol. 1, Hannover, 1826) in his comment on *Odyssey* 1.96-102. After declaring that gods as well as men put their shoes off "bei längerer Ruhe" (also, incidentally, a mere guess; Homer never says they do), he asserts, "Telemach hatte die seinigen auch im Schiffe abgelegt."

¹⁹ This was the view of Nitzsch (*op. cit.*, note on 4.306-311); "Jeder, der aus dem Bette aufsteht, bindet sich Sohlen unter, denn nicht leicht blieb man früh ruhig im Hause; nur dass es dem Dichter nicht immer beliebt die Sohlen ausdrücklich zu erwähnen." Nitzsch believed, however, that the Homeric heroes took off their shoes whenever they spent any considerable time at home. Cf. also his note on *Odyssey* 1.96-102 mentioned in the last footnote.

²⁰ Voss (*Mythologische Briefe*, 1, p. 133), asserts that Menelaus wears shoes on this occasion "zur Ehre der Gäste und der zwiefachen Hochzeitfeier." This theory is opposed by Nitzsch, *op. cit.*, note on 4.306-311. Cf. also Crusius' (*Homeri Odyssea*, crates Heft, 4th ed. Hannover, 1863) note on 1.96, "Sandalen wurden unter die Füße gebunden, wenn man ausgehen, oder in völliger Kleidung erscheinen wollte."

²¹ Cf. Van Leeuwen on 20.164, "In aula quin crebrarum illarum cenarum aliquae reliquiae iacuerint non est dubium, et prope etiam πολλὰ κόπρος erat congesta (17.297)."

²² *Loc. cit.* Cf. also Seymour, *Life, etc.*, p. 170, "Like the man's *chlaena* [sandals] are not worn in the house."

²³ The reason for Homer's usual silence about shoes might be the same as that suggested by the scholiast for his failure to mention a sword in 17.4, τὸ δὲ ξίφος σεσώπηκεν ἐπειδὴ τὸ ξιφηφορεῖν ἀέτ τε ἦν καὶ σὺν ἥρῃ.

²⁴ Another curious silence was remarked by Seymour; no woman in Homer is said to be wearing shoes. For that matter, shoes are specifically given to very few of the men: only to Agamemnon and Nestor in the *Iliad*, to Telemachus, Menelaus, and Eumaeus in the *Odyssey*.

²⁵ "Greek Shoes in the Classical Period," *Harvard Studies in Class. Phil.*, x (1899) 57-102. My quotations are from p. 59.

²⁶ Menelaus' reference to Telemachus' feet in *Odyssey* 4.149 proves nothing, of course; the shoes may have been of such a sort as to leave much of the foot visible.

Aeneid IV: Tragedy or Melodrama?

by H. L. Tracy

THE interpreters of the Dido-episode never seem to be wholly at their ease. Some of them protest too much in their defence of it. Others admit shortcomings, but do not appear to come to grips with the matter. Few appear ready to admit that it may be artistically a courageous failure.¹

The clue has often appeared, but has not been rigorously followed.² Everyone recognizes that the treatment of the Dido-story is dramatic. Prescott,³ for example, shows in detail how the typical stages in the unfolding of a Greek tragedy may be seen in Vergil: the prologue, exposition, and development in Book I; the complication, reversal of fortune, catastrophe and theophany in the remainder. But is it possible that a dramatic structure within an epic framework is *ab initio* doomed to failure?⁴ Is such an experiment akin to putting an Ionic portico on a Gothic building?

It may well be that the two methods—the dramatic and the epic—are incompatible. The epic is diffuse and leisurely; its story is prolix, it tolerates episodic development, it generally shows a hero beset by difficulties but surmounting them by some persistent and consistent qualities of character. Drama, on the other hand, is compact and concentrated, its story is tightly organized, it abhors the episode, it (at least tragic drama) shows a hero failing to survive his difficulties, often by some lapse of character or insight. In so far as epic reveals personality through speeches, those speeches are oratorical;⁵ in so far as it

delineates character, it does so to a good extent by analysis and description. Drama reveals personality through expressive and reflective speeches; where character is mediated by action, it is revealed to us through our total and cumulative impression of a man dealing with a situation, rarely if at all by deliberate analysis.⁶

Now, within the story of Dido the epic and dramatic modes are mixed. And within the structure of the *Aeneid* as a whole the Dido-episode is a dramatic inset. The sensitive artistic judgment may not incline favorably to either of these procedures.⁷ Not that this is the heart of the matter. Yet it must be said by way of overture that Vergil was taking a great risk in making such an experiment. Had the dramatic procedure been so modified as not to obtrude itself in the midst of an epic poem, he might have succeeded. Or had the dramatic handling been more sure, the results might have been more satisfying. This paper will try to show serious reasons for thinking that the dramatic workmanship itself was faulty, and that the Dido-story is consequently something of a literary failure.

Faulty Dramatic Workmanship?

Drama, as Horace observes,⁸ is a tricky and precarious vehicle. Unless it is handled with sure skill, tragedy easily "vergit ad imum" into melodrama. Much of Euripides, in the writer's opinion, must be defined as melodrama, because the excitement and emotional stress is out of proportion to the significance of the theme. The *Medea*, for example, is a moving and intense piece; but Euripides hardly succeeds in convincing us that the whole thing was worth while, that there was something big at stake, that the feelings and events shown in the play grow out of a profound, universal, awe-inspiring experience.

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If Vergil conceived the story of Dido as a drama, did he have the materials in the first place, or did he have the necessary technical skill, to make of it a tragedy in the full sense of the word? One needs some hardihood to lay down exact specifications for tragedy. On the other hand, one must not make the serious blunder of using the term "tragedy" or even "drama" loosely. The integrity of such definitions is important. Perhaps the following broad suggestions, put forward as a means of assessing the drama of Dido, may not be altogether inadequate.

Four Types of Tragedy

Tragedies fall into four rough types. A tragedy may show a man confronted by the awful power of destiny or divine will or circumstance, and being overwhelmed by that power. Oedipus entangled in the tightening web of fate, Hippolytus struck down by the ruthlessness of Aphrodite, Hardy's Tess conquered by the paralyzing perversity of coincidence, are all examples of the first type, which we may call the Tragedy of Irony.

In a second type emphasis is laid on the quality of the man who confronts destiny, and the battle he puts up against it. It shows both his nobility and his errors of judgment, his failures of intuition, the mixture of strength which arouses our admiration with a lack of balance or a perversity through which he forfeits our sympathy. The result is that we can just bear to see his collapse, even to acquiesce in it, while we still retain an admiration for his character as a whole. This is Aristotle's favorite type;⁹ it may be called the Tragedy of Character.

Again, tragedy may be, as Hegel thought it should,¹⁰ the conflict of two valid moral principles, embodied in two persons. Each of the principles is good in itself, and each of the two persons is sincere and serious. But the principles and the persons are in the given situation incompatible; or else their claims, however just, are pressed without proper balance or mutual sympathy or regard for still other just claims. Such is the essence of the *Antigone*: the claim of religious conviction clashing with the claim of civil authority, the one claim pressed with a dogged fanaticism, the other

with a rigid officiousness. Both had a good case; but those particular cases—as they still often are—were irreconcilable when put forward by over-zealous advocates. Shall we call this the Tragedy of Conflicting Convictions?

A fourth type presents the clash of a certain temperament with another temperament or with a practical situation. This is only our previous type brought down to the level of passion, prejudice, and predicament. Thousands of ancient and modern plays, not to mention novels and movies, are built on this pattern. Well handled, they may be significant and tragic; but they show a distinct tendency to fall off into merely "strong drama" or into outright melodrama. We may call this the Drama of Situation, and give it only partial standing in the class of tragedy.

Is the Dido-Episode Tragic?

The proposal is, then, that we ask ourselves whether the drama of Dido satisfies us in the light of any of these definitions. Does it show the irony of human beings at grips with destiny? or human character and personality going down nobly, though not quite undeservingly, to defeat? or human conscience and conviction faced with an insoluble dilemma? or a human being tackling a situation with such a pronounced bias of nature or temper that a tragic collision and collapse are inevitable?

The power of destiny is not, in the writer's opinion, grandly conceived in the drama of Dido. There is a distinct touch of the tawdry about it. Profoundly serious as Vergil himself is, noble as the general religious sentiment of the *Aeneid* is, the company of deities who represent the fatal powers in this particular part are somewhat shabby. Their quarrels and trickery are not in the noble style. Jupiter's absent-mindedness and sudden recall to the realities of the situation, the craft and malice of Juno (for which the poet is moved to apologize¹¹), the fond scheming of Venus, and the slightly vulgar device of substituting Cupid for Ascanius—all these are such as to reduce the story considerably below the requisite level of grandeur. If this drama is to be acceptable *qua* drama, it must rest upon other features than the solemnity of super-

natural control or the awe-compelling power of the heavenly beings.

Aeneas: Dignified or Aloof?

Is there, then, a tragic power derived from the dignity of human character? We can, by common consent, deal summarily with Aeneas in this respect. He is dignified, of course, in the narrow sense of the word. But his is the dignity of aloofness, and Vergil takes every care, for obvious reasons, to keep him aloof. He has not the true dignity of the man who stands up in the full glare of publicity and comes through a searching ordeal without any sign of a mean spirit. Aeneas is not allowed to face the ordeal. What of Dido? She makes a good start. Everything in her bearing at first is generous, noble, womanly, well-poised. But can we honestly say that she is wholly noble or great in facing her ordeal? We may be so chivalrous as to refrain from criticizing womanhood, even in frailty. Our sympathy is summoned up by any spectacle of great suffering. We are willing to see a good deal of dignity in suffering as such. But, as a dramatic character, Dido is after all not on a consistently noble plane. She is not allowed to be, either. The sensational symptoms of her passion for Aeneas, the vacillation in her loyalty to Sychaeus, her seeking of occasions to be with Aeneas, the neglect of her royal duties during the time of her infatuation, the fatal impulse of the cave-scene, the outbursts of invective against Aeneas alternating with appeals for pity (much less noble than consistency in pride or scorn or supplication or resignation would have been), the bitterness and scorn of her repudiation of Aeneas and of human honor as a whole, all these make us feel that she has not met the situation without a falling-off in quality and a consequent forfeiture of our respect and sympathy. And this is not the ordinary tragic *hamartia*; it is a more serious disintegration of character that disqualifies the queen for a fully tragic role.

Do Aeneas and Dido represent great and profound principles which are to meet in irreconcilable conflict? Aeneas's devotion to his mission is a conviction that brings him at last, not without external prompting, back to his duty. But his sense of mission was not

the essence of his conflict with Dido. It was not a positive force that confronted some positive force in her. For the purposes of this drama we are concerned with Aeneas as a man; and the sketch of his emotional experience is too slight to capture much of our interest. The sense of mission is a force behind the whole story, but not a major factor in this particular part of it. Dido's conviction is based upon her vow of loyalty to her dead husband. Deathbed promises are often the most cruel impositions that human beings can put on one another. Solemn as such vows may be, they surely do not carry the weight of profound conscientious principles. However strongly Dido may have felt herself obligated, her feeling cannot be rated as loyalty to a big and eternally valid conviction. Her problem was more formal and particular than universal, and we are left unsatisfied with it as a tragic situation in the full sense.¹²

Lack of Consistent Feeling?

If we admit our fourth type among the possible forms of tragedy, we should require a strongly marked emotional type or attitude confronted by another marked type or by a practical dilemma.¹³ Again Aeneas fails to qualify, because his feelings are kept too rigidly in abeyance. In Dido we should have to find a consistent impulsiveness, or a consistent fear of insecurity, or a consistent self-deception motivating her entanglement with Aeneas and aggravating the shock of his desertion. The word consistent has been emphasized because in this type of drama the significance is derived precisely from the strength and pervasiveness of one attitude, and from what happens when that attitude ends in frustration. But Dido's character is almost kaleidoscopic in range, as we have observed. No persistent trait can be found to give consistency to the development or to show how a strong bent or prejudice can recoil upon itself.

Objection to the present thesis might be raised in this fashion: even if the supernatural setting is not conceived with the dignity we look for in high tragedy, even if the characters are not noble enough, the issue great enough, or the temperaments marked enough to give

the incidents a tragic power, yet the story on the whole and cumulatively has the tragic effect. True, this story is one of the most moving things in classical literature; yet it falls below the level of tragedy. Aristotle uses the word "harrowing" to describe a drama of suffering that lacks the proper ethical balance. There are harrowing situations that lend themselves to a semi-dramatic treatment, and that produce something very like the pity and fear that tragedy aims to arouse; but they are not tragedy.

To the writer this conclusion seems inevitable: that Vergil chose to present the story of Dido in dramatic form, and was not wholly

successful in accommodating it to his epic pattern, though he commands our respect for a bold experiment in a mixed genre; that, further, having chosen the dramatic form he is not careful to blend all the elements necessary to drama in the right proportion. The setting should have been grander, or the characters more noble, or the motives more universally valid, or the human attitudes more strongly marked, or the dilemma more forthright and cogent. It is a moving and disturbing story; it is a significant departure in technique that opened up vistas he never dreamed of; but in itself it falls just short of its aim.

NOTES

¹ T. R. Glover, *Studies in Virgil* (London, Edward Arnold, 1904) 160-161, raises the point. In the writer's opinion his final verdict on the failure of the Dido-tragedy (190-191) is not really in line with the rest of his treatment.

² W. Y. Sellar, *Roman Poets of the Republic* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1877) brings forward a number of indictments against Vergil's dramatic procedure, including (387-389) lack of clarity in character-drawing, inadequate language, external motivation of action, "tame" conception of character; (399) his skill in conceiving a state of feeling or situation offset by weakness in sustaining and developing a vital character.

³ H. W. Prescott, *The Development of Vergil's Art* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927) 272-273.

⁴ N. W. DeWitt, *The Dido Episode in the Aeneid of Vergil* (Toronto, William Briggs, 1907) 38-39 gives a lively outline of the problem of incongruity in genre.

⁵ Sellar, *op. cit.* (see note 2) 400.

⁶ It is only fair to warn the reader that "tragedy" is

here being used in a pretty strict sense, meaning the Sophoclean type.

⁷ DeWitt, *op. cit.* (see note 4) 27, decides in favor of the fourth book, but expresses doubt as to the relation of that book to the *Aeneid* as a whole.

⁸ *De Arte Poetica*, 377-378.

⁹ *Ars Poetica*, 1453 a 15.

¹⁰ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art* (transl. F. P. B. Osmaston, London, Bell, 1920) vol. iv, 293-301.

¹¹ *Aen.*, i, 11.

¹² As Glover, *op. cit.* (see note 1) 175, puts it: "... in her hour of need, she has nothing adequate on which to fall back." Prescott, *op. cit.* (see note 3) 286, shows how Vergil's treatment of the vow differs from the traditional one.

¹³ Glover, *op. cit.* (see note 1) 162, makes Dido and Aeneas represent their respective national temperaments. It is hard to see much emphasis in this direction in Vergil. Glover himself does not seem to follow up his point with care.

FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING

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HEADQUARTERS: HOTEL SINTON

When was the King of Birds first associated
with the Father of Gods and Men?

The Eagle of Zeus

by George E. Mylonas

AMONG scholars it has become a common practice to associate the eagle intimately with Zeus, and to consider the king of birds as an inseparable companion and attribute of the Father of Gods and Men. And this practice is justified by the many representations of Zeus in which the eagle is present.

The association of Zeus and the eagle in the minds of the people of ancient Greece is easy to understand. It was vividly expressed by Cook some time ago: "From the first the eagle appearing far up in the blue was a visible manifestation, nay an actual embodiment of Zeus."¹ The question, however, of the time and place of this association has been avoided thus far, and scholars in general assume that from the very beginning of the Greek historic era and in all parts of Greece the eagle was accepted as a companion and an attribute of Zeus. The first three words in Cook's quotation indicate clearly the attitude of scholars on that score, and this attitude is by no means confined to modern authorities.

Apostoles, the Byzantine paroemiographer of the fifteenth century, has preserved the following interesting tradition: "They say that the eagle was born at the time of the birth of Zeus and that in the battle against the Giants it flew by his side. Consequently, when the birds were divided among the Gods, Zeus chose the eagle."² One of the most

popular and prevalent traditions of antiquity maintained that Zeus was born and reared in Crete and in the Dictaeon cave. Moirao of Byzantium, a writer of ca. 300 B.C., tells us that a great eagle brought nectar to the baby Zeus lying in the cave,³ while Aglaosthenes in his *Naxiaca* states that Zeus in the form of an eagle arrived at Naxos from Crete. In the Island of Naxos he remained until he was ready to fight against the Giants, and then he received a good omen from an eagle which brought him thunderbolts. Hence, he placed the bird among the stars.⁴

Not Associated in Homer

Certainly these traditions seem to indicate that "from the very beginning" the eagle was associated with Zeus and indicate that the association was consummated in Southern Greece. Yet these traditions are very late in date, and one could assume that they were created in an effort to explain an existing fact. This assumption is strengthened considerably by the evidence obtainable from our earlier literary traditions. These are included of course in our Homeric poems. In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Zeus is well established at the head of the Olympian pantheon. He already possesses the thunderbolt, but the eagle does not seem to be intimately associated with him. One would expect to find the bird with Zeus when the supreme god descends from Olympus to follow the battle in the Plain of Ilium. But when Zeus "faring from heaven adown, took seat on the summit of Ida—Ida, the many-fountained; his hands were holding the lightning."⁵ The eagle is not even mentioned. It is true that the eagle in the Homeric poems is the "bird of omen," the "surest of omens," often sent by Zeus; but as yet it is not considered as the companion or attribute of the great god, nor his "embodiment."

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We may recall the argument which developed between Polydamas and Hector, when an eagle dropped a writhing snake in the middle of the victorious and elated Trojans. Polydamas explained the occurrence as an omen that forbade the contemplated attack against the Greek ships, and advised the Trojans to abandon the project, to be satisfied with their victory, and to retire to the Trojan walls. To this Hector, bent on pressing the military advantages already obtained, and hoping for a final victory, replied: "Thou now biddest obey lone birds of wide-spreading pinions! Whereto I will give heed—no, never! . . . Nay, for us, let us trust to all-mighty Zeus and his counsels."⁶ Certainly this statement of Hector seems to indicate that the eagle was not as yet linked closely with Zeus.

In the *Odyssey* we can find at least one piece of additional evidence leading to the same conclusion. The people of Ithaca were convened in a general assembly to hear the words of Telemachos, now grown to manhood. To them, and to Telemachos, Zeus sent "two eagles to fly from aloft" and these birds tore each other over the assembly in full view of the people assembled. When Halitherses tried to explain the omen as a sure sign of destruction of the suitors and tried to use it as a means of rousing the people against them, Eurymachos, the son of Polybos, one of the suitors, exclaimed in anger: "Many birds indeed fly about under the beams of the sun, nor are all ominous." No special significance is attached to the fact that the birds were eagles. And this could not be attributed to the folly of the suitors, whom the gods wished to destroy, because a little later Mentor, in his efforts to rouse the people of Ithaca against the suitors, did not even mention the fight of the eagles.⁷

In Hesiod, Zeus is pictured as ruling over Olympus "having the thunder and the bright thunderbolt." In his battle against the Giants we would expect to find the eagle by his side, if it had become by now his companion and attribute. Yet when Zeus went to battle he took "thunder and lightning, and the blazing thunderbolt, the arrows of Zeus the great."⁸

The eagle is not even mentioned, and it is certainly permissible to assume that the bird as yet was not conceived as the companion and attribute of Zeus.

We have to come down, in time of course, to Pindar and his first Pythian Ode, composed ca. 470 B.C., to find the eagle perched on top of the sceptre of Zeus.⁹ But even in Pindar the eagle does not seem to be the attribute of Zeus, but his messenger, the "archos oiōnōn," a bird of omen sent by Zeus. Sophocles in a fragment published by Nauck refers to the eagle as the companion of Zeus; and Aristophanes calls the bird the "skēptrobamōn aetos," certainly a reference to the Pindaric statement of "kuōn Dios."¹⁰

The Eagle and Zeus the Hurler

This rapid survey of our early literary sources seems to indicate that at the "beginning" of the historic period of Greece the bird was not associated so closely with Zeus as to be accepted as his attribute. Additional evidence to the same effect is to be obtained from a survey of the artistic remains of the late Geometric, the Archaic, and the Transitional periods.¹¹ Our earliest representation of Zeus with the eagle is a bronze statuette of Zeus Keraunios, or the Hurler, from the sanctuary of Mount Lykaion. This statuette, according to Kourouniotes, its discoverer, dates from the seventh century.¹² A life-sized statue of Zeus the Hurler, upholding an eagle on his outstretched left hand, was placed in the precinct of Olympia by the Metapontines.¹³ Perhaps this statue is represented on the reverse of some rare Olympian staters, dating from ca. 471-432 B.C.¹⁴ At any rate, on those rare coins we have our type of Zeus the Hurler with his eagle. Bronze statuettes of Zeus the Hurler with the eagle on his outstretched left hand were also found in the precinct of Olympia, and the earliest of these seems to date from ca. 480 B.C.¹⁵ Later in date is another bronze representation of Zeus the Hurler with the eagle found by Rhomaeos in Ambrakia. According to the conclusion of its publisher, the statuette seems to have been influenced by the Ithomatas Zeus of Hageladas, and the majority of scholars be-

lieve it to be of Corinthian workmanship and derivation.¹⁶ Our list of early examples of Zeus the Hurler with an eagle must be closed with the famous statue of Zeus Ithomatas, made for the Messenians of Naupactos ca. 455 B.C. by Hageladas, the great master of the Transitional Period.¹⁷

The Eagle and the Lykaian Zeus

Besides the type of Zeus the Hurler with the eagle perched on his outstretched left hand, we have another early fifth-century type of a seated Zeus with the bird. On the obverse of the federal silver coins used in Arcadia during the greater part of the fifth century, and apparently minted at Heraea, we find a bearded Zeus seated on a throne while his eagle is represented flying to or from him.¹⁸ The seated god apparently is the Lykaian Zeus. Almost the same type of Zeus with the eagle flying before him is encountered on staters from Olympia dating, according to Seltman, from ca. 452-432 B.C.¹⁹ It seems probable, as Cook has pointed out some time ago,²⁰ that the type on the Olympia coins exercised some influence on the Pheidian type of the god; in the famous chryselephantine statue of Pheidias the eagle was placed on top of the sceptre of the god, in agreement with the Pindaric tradition. On the other hand, it seems very probable that the coin type was directly derived from the Lykaian Zeus of the Arcadian coins.²⁰ It is certain that at Cyrene we have a cult of the Lykaian Zeus, and that god is represented on the golden staters of the city.²¹ This will indicate that the seated bearded figure with an eagle flying to him painted on the black-figured "Cyrenaic" kylix No. 2668 and the almost identical composition in the Taranto Kylix illustrated by Cook is no other than the Lykaian Zeus.²² It is now generally accepted that Laconia was the original home of the "Cyrenaic" ware.²³ Mount Lykaion is not very far from Laconia, and the Laconian potters would naturally represent the Lykaian Zeus in cups destined for Cyrene, where the cult of that god seems to have been popular.²⁴ It is safe, therefore, to conclude that the type of the seated Zeus with the

eagle was known to the vase-painters of Laconia and of the Lykaion district in the late Archaic Period (ca. 520-500 B.C.)

Zeus of Ambrakia

It is now time to note that the only representation of Zeus with the eagle found outside the Peloponnesus, and dating from the first half of the fifth century, is the Zeus Keraunios of Ambrakia. And this statuette, as we have seen, is of Corinthian or Peloponnesian origin. Indeed we have other representations of Zeus from northern Greece, especially from Dodona, the most famous sanctuary of Zeus in Epeiros. We may here single out two well-preserved bronze statuettes of Zeus from that site. One of them is in the Museum at Athens and dates from ca. 480 B.C.,²⁵ and the other is in Berlin and dates from ca. 470-460 B.C.²⁶ In these statuettes Zeus is represented with thunderbolt in the right hand, but without an eagle on the extended left. The absence of the eagle is also noted in the bronze statue from Artemision, which I believe to represent Zeus Keraunios, and also in a number of representations of the Father of Gods and Men in vase painting and sculpture.²⁷ Based on the artistic remains from Greece, we have suggested in our study on "The Bronze Statue from Artemision" that the Zeus Keraunios without the eagle represented a northern type, while that with the eagle a southern or Peloponnesian type. And this suggestion is strengthened by the literary evidence preserved in Homer and Hesiod, our earliest works, which are accepted as reflecting northern Greek traditions. Certainly all evidence seems to point to the south and to the Peloponnesus as the locale where originated the type of Zeus the Hurler with the eagle.

The Peloponnesus was suggested by George W. Elderkin as the place where "Zeus with a thunderbolt in the right hand and an eagle on the outstretched left hand seems to have appeared first."²⁸ In my article on "The Bronze Statue from Artemision," I have advocated the same origin for the type. Now I wish to claim that at the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaios of Arcadia the god and the eagle

were associated for the first time, and that from there the association was spread to the rest of Greece.

Oldest Examples in Arcadia

We have seen that the oldest examples of Zeus with the eagle were found in the precinct of Zeus Lykaïos; that the Lykaian Zeus with the eagle seems to have been borrowed and employed by the officials of Olympia on their coins and statuary. We must now turn our attention briefly to the sanctuary of Zeus on Mount Lykaion. The cult of Zeus on that mount seems to be one of the oldest cults of the supreme god in the Peloponnesus. Not only some of the features of the cult, such as the practice of human sacrifice, seem to be strange to the Greek ritualistic practices, but the altar of Zeus itself is unique among the shrines of the historic period of Greece. It was described carefully by Pausanias in antiquity,²⁹ and in our times it was revealed by C. Kourouniotes. It consisted of a mound-altar flanked by two columns, on top of which were to be seen, in the times of Pausanias, two eagles facing the east.³⁰

In my study on "The Altar of Zeus Lykaïos,"³¹ I proved, I believe, that the elements which went to make this strange altar find their exact parallels in Minoan-Mycenaean religious edifices and practices; that the altar must have been a prehistoric shrine which was taken over by Zeus when the historic Greek tribes took complete possession of the land. On that prehistoric altar, and in accordance with the well-established practice of the remote prehistoric times, were displayed two birds of the same species.³² The birds as well as the other elements of the altar were kept by the new-comers, by the Aryan worshippers of Zeus. In prehistoric times the birds indicated the epiphany of the divinity.³³ Probably at the beginning of the historic period the birds continued to indicate the epiphany of Zeus. But gradually, and in accordance with the law established by Usener,³⁴ the birds were conceived as the companions and attributes of the god. The god worshipped at the mountain altar in historic times was Zeus, the sky god; the birds, that now become his companions, in

order that they might equal the majesty of the god, were naturally conceived as eagles.³⁵ And so it is probable that the close association of Zeus and the eagle was established early in the historic period on Mount Lykaion. From there it was spread to the surrounding territory, to Olympia, the other important cult center of Zeus in the Peloponnesus, and thence, after the fifth century, to the rest of the Greek world.

Late Association in North

No other site in the Peloponnesus can parallel or even approach the imposing evidence which points to Mount Lykaion as the birth-place of the association. Northern Greece cannot claim the distinction, because, as we have seen, our northern literary traditions and the art remains of the north definitely prove that the eagle was not associated intimately with Zeus in that territory until later times. The eagle in connection with Zeus is mentioned by Pindar, Sophocles and Aristophanes, all writers of the first half of the fifth century. A representation of Zeus brandishing the thunderbolt in his right and upholding an eagle on the extended left hand on a red-figured amphora by the Altamura painter, seems to be our earliest Attic representation of the association.³⁶ Even if we admit the vase as evidence for the north we cannot date it long before 460 B.C. Our available evidence, therefore, seems to indicate that, at the earliest, the beginning of the fifth century could be accepted as the time when the eagle and Zeus are connected intimately in the north. By then the association was well established and had almost become traditional in the Peloponnesus. We may therefore conclude that the eagle was first conceived as a companion of Zeus and as his attribute around the altar of Mount Lykaion; perhaps this took place late in the eighth century B.C. From there the notion spread first to the rest of the Peloponnesus and then to northern Greece. It is possible to believe that the chryselephantine statue of Zeus by Pheidias, made for the temple at Olympia, helped to popularize and to establish this association in the Greek world. At any rate, by the fourth century the notion had become

universal.³⁷ So universal, indeed, that in later days various traditions were created to the effect that Zeus and the eagle were born on the same day; that Zeus was nurtured by an eagle; that the eagle became the favorite form assumed by Zeus whenever he wanted to approach his fair victims unobserved.

NOTES

¹ A. B. Cook, *Zeus, A Study in Ancient Religion*, II, 752.

² Apostoles, p. 28, "On the Proverb."

³ Ap. Athenaeos 491 A-B.

⁴ *Naxiaca*, fragment 2, in *Fragmenta Hist. Graec.*—ed. Muller, IV, 293.

⁵ *Iliad* 11.184 Translation by Smith and Miller.

⁶ *Iliad* 12.237ff. Translation by Smith and Miller.

⁷ *Odyssey* 2.146ff.

⁸ *Theogony* 71, 504, 707-708, 853-854.

⁹ *Pyth.* 1.9ff.

¹⁰ Nauck³, frag. 799, p. 318, and John Williams White, *ap. schol. Aristoph.*, Av. 515.

¹¹ The chronological limits of these periods I should like to accept as follows: Late Geometric ca. 750-650 B.C.; Archaic, ca. 650-510; Transitional, ca. 510-450 B.C.

¹² *Ephemeris*, 1904, 153-214. Figs. 8-10 and p. 181f. A second statuette of the same type but later in date was also found in the precinct.

¹³ Pausanias 5.22.5. The statue is reported to have been made by the Aeginetan Aristonous. Brunn and Overbeck (in *Geschichte der griechischen Kunstler*, Stuttgart, 1853, I, 96; *Gr. Kunstmyth.* Zeus, p. 16f.) have maintained that the statue must have been made before 458 B.C. when the independence of Aegina was lost.

¹⁴ Babelon, *Monn. gr. rom.*, II, I 885ff., no. 1254, pl. 39, 1. For date see Seltman in *Nomisma* 8 (1913) 24, 35f.

¹⁵ *Olympia*, Bronzen, pl. VII, 45; now in the National Museum at Athens, No. 619S.

¹⁶ *Deltion* 21 (1920) pp. 169-171 and figs 3-6.

¹⁷ Pausanias 4.33.2. The type has been preserved on the silver coins of Messene struck ca. 330-280 B.C.; cf. Imhoof-Blumer and P. Gardner, *Num. Comm. Paus.* 2.67f. pl. P, S. *British Mus. Cat. Coins, Peloponnesus*, p. 110, pl. 22 b. I do not agree with C. A. Robinson's interpretation of the type as it appeared in *AJA* 49 (1945) 121-127; I hope to publish a note on the matter in the near future.

¹⁸ *Brit. Mus. Cat. Coins, Peloponnesus*, p. 59, pl. 31, 11-15. Cook, *op. cit.* I, p. 68 and figs. 39-45.

¹⁹ *Brit. Mus. Cat. Coins, Peloponnesus* p. 59, pl. 10, 11. Seltman in *Nomisma* 8 (1913) 43, 57f.

²⁰ Cook, *op. cit.*, II, p. 757.

²¹ Herodotus 4.203, mentions a "hill of Zeus Lykaioes" near Cyrene. For the coins cf. L. Muller, *Numismatique de l'Ancienne Afrique*, (Copenhagen, 1860) I, 48 no. 184, fig. 184. Cook, *op. cit.*, I, p. 90.

²² Cook, *op. cit.*, I, p. 93, fig. 65, and p. 782, pl. xlii.

²³ J. P. Droop in *BSA* (1907-1908) 2, 44ff. and Dawkins *JHS* (1908) 322f.

²⁴ We have also to recall that Alkman composed a hymn to Zeus Lykaioes (Bergk,⁴ Alkman frag. 1ff.) Cook, *op. cit.*, I, p. 93, considers the "Cyrenaic" cup as the "counterpart of the Hymn."

²⁵ No. 31. Carapanos, *Dodone et ses ruines*, pl. 12, 4.

²⁶ Neugebauer, K. A. *Antike Bronzesstatuerren*, fig. 28; Lamb, W., *Greek and Roman Bronzes*, pls. 54a and 149.

²⁷ A good many of these are mentioned in my article on "The Bronze Statue from Artemision," *AJA* 48 (1944) 143-160.

²⁸ *AJA* 49 (1940) 225-233.

²⁹ Pausanias 8.38.7.

³⁰ *Ephemeris* (1904) 153-214. See also Cook, *op. cit.*, I, 81-88; F. H. Marshall, *Class. Rev.* 9 (1905) 280ff.

³¹ *Classical Studies in Honor of William Abbott Oldfather* (Urbana, 1943) Mylonas, 122-133.

³² For a list of prehistoric representations of two birds on shrines see Mylonas, *op. cit.*, 129-130. This "double feature," so characteristic of Minoan-Mycenaean practice, cannot be emphasized enough.

³³ See Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and Its Survival in Greek Religion* (Lund, 1927) 285-294. Mylonas, *op. cit.*, 128.

³⁴ The "law of religious development" Usener, *Gottentamen* (Bonn, 1896); cf. Mylonas, *op. cit.*, 129.

³⁵ See Cook, *op. cit.*, II, p. 752. Cf. Apuleius' description of an eagle's flight; *Apul. flor.* 2 and Tennyson's fragment "The Eagle."

³⁶ A. Merlin, "Le Zeus fulminant du Peintre d'Altamura" in *Monuments Piot* 35 (1935-36) 73-92.

³⁷ See for example the group of "Leda and the Swan" by Timotheos, "Ganymedes and the Eagle" by Leochares, and the even later frieze of the Pergamene altar. Incidentally it seems that the composition of the frieze might have caused the creation of the tradition of the eagle at the side of Zeus in his fight against the Giants. Also see Cook, I, p. 532 and II, pp. 187-189, note 8.

To appear soon in THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL:

"THE MORAL BASIS OF HOSPITIUM PRIVATUM"

by Oscar E. Nybakken

"REVITALIZING BEGINNERS' GREEK THROUGH HOMER"

by Raymond V. Schoder, S.J.

Artillery involves the hurling of missiles heavier than a man can throw unaided. This means that a machine of some sort must be used. Where and when were such machines invented?

The Origin of

Greek and Roman Artillery

by Leigh Alexander

IN THESE modern days, especially in World War II when even our artillery, not to mention the atomic bomb, is so powerful and so tremendous, it is timely and appropriate to consider the origin of ancient artillery, an origin which no one knows with absolute certainty, although some very confident statements on the subject have been made both by ancient and by modern writers.

The Assyrian origin to be suggested in this paper can not as yet be conclusively proved by historical or archaeological evidence, e.g. by an Assyrian inscription or sculptured relief. If such evidence did exist, the origin would be a matter of common knowledge and no investigation of the subject would be needed. It is precisely because the problem is one involving uncertainty that a study of it becomes worth while, in order to survey the entire situation and see how far we can safely go at present.

I

Everyone who has read Caesar is familiar with the Roman *tormenta*, artillery machines which, though far inferior to modern artillery, were surprisingly effective and dangerous in ancient warfare. The word *tormentum* indicates their motive power, twisted cords or thongs; and the missiles were, in the main, arrows from the *catapulta*, stones from the *ballista*, and javelins from the *scorpio*.

But where did these machines originate? Caesar was by no means the first to use them, c. 50 B.C. To mention only a few earlier cases,

we know that Marcellus and the great inventor Archimedes used them at Syracuse in the second Punic War, c. 215 B.C. In the Hellenistic period they were used by the famous Demetrius Poliorcetes (the "Taker of Cities"), c. 305 B.C. Alexander used them constantly, e.g. in the siege of Tyre and other cities, c. 325 B.C. Philip, his father, also had them, c. 350 B.C.

The earliest known use of such machines in the Greek world was by Dionysius the Elder, the tyrant of Syracuse, c. 400 B.C. Diodorus the Sicilian, a historian of the time of Caesar and Cicero, says that the catapult was invented¹ by the military engineers and experts brought together in Syracuse by Dionysius from all over the Mediterranean world. His rewards stimulated them to great rivalry in their work, and it seems very probable that they did effect several improvements in these machines.

Diodorus' statement is followed without question by a number of eminent modern authorities, e.g. Eduard Meyer,² Adolf Bauer,³ Lammert,⁴ Bury (both in his *History of Greece*⁵ and in the *Cambridge Ancient History*⁶), and also (in 1923) by Eugene S. McCartney,⁷ in his excellent little book on *Warfare*, in the "Debt to Greece and Rome" series. McCartney's statement, for example, says plainly "The credit for invention must go to the Sicilian Greeks. Diodorus the Sicilian, who is doubtless proud of the achievements of his countrymen, tells us that the catapult was invented in Syracuse about 400 B.C. under the patronage of Dionysius."

But there is a passage in the Hebrew scriptures (2 Chronicles 26. 15) about King Uzziah (Azariah) of Judah, which reads as follows: "And he made in Jerusalem engines, invented by skilful men, to be on the towers and upon the battlements, wherewith to shoot arrows

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and great stones. And his name spread far abroad; for he was marvellously helped, till he was strong." Uzziah's date was c. 750 B.C. If this account about his artillery is true, it places the origin of such machines in the Near East, not in Sicily, and almost four hundred years earlier than Dionysius the Elder.

II

It seems inconceivable that the eminent modern authorities mentioned above could have overlooked this passage about King Uzziah's catapults. They must certainly have known about it. Their complete silence about it, therefore, must mean that they consider the account to be historically valueless. It then becomes necessary for us to investigate briefly the credibility and historical value of this passage.

The Chronicler's name is unknown, as is true of most, if not all, of the authors of the books in the Old Testament. It is generally agreed by modern scholars⁸ that he lived and wrote no earlier than the fourth century, about 325 B.C., the time of Alexander. His account, therefore, is not at all contemporary with Uzziah; and at first sight it looks as if he may be projecting a description of the siege-machines of his own time into the time of Uzziah, over four centuries earlier. In addition to this, it is generally agreed by modern Biblical scholars⁹ that the Chronicler is fairly uniformly unreliable, except where he depends on the two books of Kings. Almost every addition by the Chronicler to Kings has been with good reason doubted; and most of his account about Uzziah's reign is not in Kings at all (2 Kings 15. 1-5). Nevertheless, there are some indirect indications that in his account of Uzziah, the Chronicler for once is following some old, true source other than Kings. (1) Authorities are well agreed that Uzziah's long reign (52 years) c. 790-738 B.C. was a period of power and expansion. Isaiah chapters 2-5 are believed to be a description of Judah in the time of Uzziah, and they describe a powerful and wealthy reign. The Chronicler's account fits in well, describing his conquests over the Philistines, the Ammonites, the Arabians, and south to the border of Egypt; his towers and fortifications at

Jerusalem and elsewhere; his agricultural prosperity; and his large and well-equipped army. (2) The prosperity of Uzziah at this time is easy to understand. Jehoash and his son Jeroboam II, two vigorous kings of Israel, had defeated¹⁰ Judah and made it almost a vassal of Israel. But Jeroboam II died about 745 B.C., and under his weak successors Israel rapidly disintegrated, thus giving Judah its chance to come up under Uzziah (Azariah). (3) An inscription¹¹ of the Assyrian emperor Tiglath Pileser IV (formerly thought to be III) in 738 B.C. mentions a king Azariah of Ya'udi as heading a coalition of nineteen states, including Hamath in Syria, against Tiglath Pileser, who overthrew the confederacy and made it tributary. If this Azariah of Ya'udi was Azariah of Judah, we have another and very strong indication of military power on his part.

But how certain is this identification? Here again we are on debated ground, and the names of great authorities can be mentioned on both sides of the question, both as "separatists," and as "unitarians." By borrowing the terminology familiar in the classical "Homeric problem," a "separatist" is here used to mean a scholar who does not accept the identification of the two Azariahs, and conversely a "unitarian" does accept it. A generation ago, oriental scholars accepted the identification as a matter of course. Then, against it, came first Winckler,¹² followed by several others, e.g. Eduard Meyer¹³ and A. T. Olmstead.¹⁴ The separatists' chief reason for their separatism seems to be, according to Meyer, the "complete impossibility" that Azariah (Uzziah) of Judah could ever have held power so far north as Hamath. They therefore place Azariah of Ya'udi, of the Tiglath Pileser inscription, in the land of Sam'al in north Syria, another name for which was Ya'di¹⁵ (not Ya'udi).

In more recent years the pendulum of opinion has swung the other way again, and at least two great scholars have strongly reaffirmed the identification, Luckenbill¹⁶ and H. R. Hall.¹⁷ The chief reason for the unitarian view seems to be that it is historically incredible that there could have been at the same time two different kings with exactly

the same name, Azariah, belonging to two different countries with exactly the same name, Ya'udi, Judah. (To this day the Arabic word for Jew is Yahudi.) In addition, there would be the "surprising," "startling wonder," frankly admitted in those very words by Olmstead himself,¹⁸ that both kings, one in Judah and one in north Syria, worshipped the same god, the Hebrew Yahweh, as indicated plainly in the last syllable of the name Azariah.

For the most part, neither the separatists nor the unitarians on this question have been able to convince their opponents. "Pointedly personal" is a mild term ("vitriolic" would be nearer the truth) to use about Luckenbill's criticism of Winckler, and also about Ed. Meyer's counterattack against Luckenbill. So when such eminent doctors disagree so emphatically, it seems to an ordinary layman that the matter must at least be regarded as an open question. However, a calm, dispassionate view of the case seems to lead, on the whole, to the conclusion that the identification is more reasonable, more possible, less of a "startling wonder," less of a tax or strain on one's powers of historical belief. We may, therefore, accept tentatively H. R. Hall's confident conclusion¹⁹ that Tiglath Pileser's Azariah of Ya'udi and Azariah (Uzziah) of Judah were one and the same, that "the Chronicler's account of the military power and prowess of Uzziah, of his soldiers and his engines of war, is remarkable, and we have no reason to doubt its truth. Such a warrior may well have imposed his dominion for a time on the north, even as far as Hamath, as a momentary "resuscitation of the Solomonic empire." The military imperialism and power of Uzziah render more credible the account of his catapults, and conversely the possession of such weapons renders more credible his power in the north. The two ideas fit together admirably.

III

We may, then, accept tentatively the existence of catapults in Jerusalem about 750 B.C. But where did Uzziah get them? It seems incredible that the king of a petty state like Judah was the very first to use such things.

A passage from the *Natural History*²⁰ of Pliny the Elder is appropriate here. It gives a long list of military weapons and devices, mentioning briefly with each one its inventor or the originating country. Some of the details of the passage are plainly unreliable from a historical point of view, because so many of the inventors are characters from mythology, e.g. Penthesilea (queen of the Amazons), and Theseus. The part of the passage that concerns us here reads as follows: "They say that Pisaeus [the son? of Tyrrhenus²¹ (the Lydian prince who took a colony of Tyrrhenians, Etruscans, to Italy)] invented the scorio, that the Cretans invented the catapult, and that the Syrophenicians invented the ballista. . . ." In spite of the shadowy, eponymous nature of the name Tyrrhenus, it may be regarded as significant that all three of the main varieties of ancient artillery are here said to have originated directly or indirectly from the ancient Near East. If the Phoenicians had such machines, it would be natural for them to hand them on to their colonists the Carthaginians; and it is easy to see how Dionysius the Elder, due to his close contact with the Carthaginians in Sicily, could get the idea from them and then greatly improve on it. It is interesting to note that Colonel J. F. C. Fuller in the 14th edition (1929) of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*²² suggests the East as the origin of ancient artillery, though he gives no reasons for his view, nor any discussion of it, except to mention Uzziah's catapults.

To come back, then, to Diodorus, it seems advisable to give up his view that the catapult was invented under Dionysius the Elder, and to believe instead, tentatively, that ancient artillery had its origin somewhere in the Near East, probably in the 8th century B.C., and that all these smaller places in the western part of the Near East, Judaea, Phoenicia, Lydia, Crete, borrowed whatever form of artillery they used from some common source. And what more probable common source could there be than Assyria, which had already had two previous periods of conquest, and was the outstanding military and imperialistic power of King Uzziah's time and later, c. 800-600 B.C.? It is well known²³ from

¹ ed.
² Ge.
³ Iw.
⁴ Pa.
So also
"Torm
Uzziah
Ezekiel
⁵ Sec.
⁶ Vo.
⁷ Wa.
⁸ Eg.
Antiqu
⁹ For
colleagu
Graduat
¹⁰ 2 K

Assyrian sculptures and inscriptions that they used the battering ram, movable towers on wheels, the sloping ramp, and other siege devices. H. R. Hall says²⁴ "the Assyrians greatly developed siegecraft, and probably were the inventors of military engineering." Olmstead, in his brilliant chapter on the "Assyrian Wolf" at the end of his *History of Assyria*, has shown that the Assyrian was not as tradition has misrepresented him, merely a bloodthirsty, savage murderer, but a genuine organizer on a large scale, with a very high degree of mental ability, initiative, and originality.

It was pointed out at the beginning of this study that, so far as we know, there is no certain evidence in Assyrian art or inscriptions indicating that the Assyrians had catapults or other forms of ancient artillery. Perhaps there may be an indication in the prayer²⁵ of Esarhaddon to the sun-god Shamash, in which the king asks about the assault of a city "whether by breach, whether by the battering-ram or the siege-engine, whether with one siege-engine or another siege-engine. . . ." In this passage the words translated "siege-engine" are of uncertain meaning, except that they obviously refer to some form of siege device. This inscription certainly proves that the Assyrians had a considerable variety of such machines. There are also²⁶ in other Assyrian inscriptions certain technical military engineering words,²⁷ one or more of which may quite possibly refer to some form of catapult, though this interpretation is not

demonstrably certain. There is, in addition, an Assyrian sculptured relief which Rawlinson²⁸ says shows a machine resembling the *ballista*, large and powerful, and covered with hides like the ram. This identification is also regarded by modern Assyriologists as quite uncertain. They are, therefore, very doubtful; and some of them even deny the existence of ancient artillery in Assyria. However, even though no conclusive Assyrian evidence of catapults has yet been found, that fact does not prove that we shall never discover any, for Mesopotamian archaeology still has very much to do. The Assyriologists are quite right to be cautious, but there is no need to be over-cautious. There is no other ancient power of the 8th century or earlier which seems so likely a source for such machines as Assyria. The Phoenician emphasis was commercial, not military; Carthage was weak and obscure until the middle of the 6th century B.C.; the ancient Cretans depended on their fleet, and did not even have fortress walls at Cnossus; the ancient Hittite, Egyptian, and Sumerian powers show not even the slightest trace of artillery machines. The balance of historical probability rests with the Assyrians; so, pending the discovery of definite information either pro or con, and remembering the known military power and originality of the Assyrians and their known use of many siege-machines, it is not going too far to place the probable origin of ancient artillery in Assyria. That is as far as we can reasonably and safely go at present.

NOTES

¹ *elphth*. Diodorus 14. 42. 1.

² *Gesch. d. Alt.* v (1902) §790, 101.

³ Iwan von Müller's *Handbuch*, IV (1893). I. 2. 417.

⁴ Pauly-Wissowa *Real-Enc.* s.v. *Katapulta*, 2483.43. So also Lafaye in Daremberg-Saglio's *Dict. des Ant.*, s.v. "Tormentum" (p. 363), who however, mentions Uziah's catapults and the reference to siege devices in Ezekiel 21.22, but dismisses them both as anachronisms.

⁵ Second edition (1914) 648.

⁶ Vol. VI. 114.

⁷ *Warfare by Land and Sea*, 42.

⁸ E.g. L. C. Purser, *Smith Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities*, s.v. "Tormentum," 856.

⁹ For these considerations I am indebted to my late colleague, Professor Kemper Fullerton of the Oberlin Graduate School of Theology.

¹⁰ 2 Kings 14.

¹¹ H. R. Hall, *Ancient History of the Near East* (1932), 461, 463, 464, and footnotes. A. T. Olmstead, *loc. cit.* in note 14 below.

¹² *Altorientalische Forschungen*, I (1893), I ff.

¹³ *Gesch. d. Alt.*, II. 2 (1921) 433 and note.

¹⁴ *History of Assyria* (1923) 184, 186, 514.

History of Palestine and Syria (1931), 251, 409, 435.

¹⁵ Ed. Meyer, *op. cit.* (see note 13) 427. H. R. Hall, *loc. cit.* in note 11 of this paper. Luckenbill, *loc. cit.* in note 16 below, p. 225, suggests that Ya'di was the name of the land, and Sam'al the name of their city.

¹⁶ *Am. Journal of Semitic Languages* 41 (1925) 217 ff.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.* in note 11 of this paper.

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.* in note 14.

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.* in note 11. "We have no option but to conclude . . ." (*italics mine*).

²⁰ 7. 56 (201): *Pisaeum invenisse dicunt venabula et*

in tormentis scorpionem, Cretas catapultam, Syro-phoenicas ballistam et fundam, aeneam tubam Pisaeum Tyrrheni, . . .

This passage is cited, without discussion of it, by L. C. Purser, in Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Rom. Antiq.* s.v. "Tormentum," 856.

²¹ Herodotus 4. 94; Dionys. Hal. 1. 27.

²² Vol. 8, p. 453, article on "Engines of War," which is not in the 11th edition of the *Enc. Brit.* but is in the 1944 edition, rewritten by Lt. Col. Calvin Goddard and omitting Fuller's reference to the origin of these machines. Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey, *The Projectile-Throwing Engines of the Ancients* (1907) 5, says Shalmaneser II of Assyria (c. 850 B.C.) did not have any such weapons, the "earliest allusion" to which he says is the account

of Uzziah's catapults, but he suggests no origin for them.

²³ A. T. Olmstead, *History of Assyria*, *passim*. See his index, s.v. "Ram," "Ramp," "Towers," "Siege-engines."

²⁴ *Ancient History of the Near East* (1932) 446.

²⁵ Olmstead, *History of Assyria*, 359.

²⁶ For this information I am indebted to Professors A. T. Olmstead and George G. Cameron of the University of Chicago.

²⁷ E.g. ašibu (Winckler, *Annals of Sargon*, no. 3, line 37); numgallè dūri, and kal-bannate (Luckenbill, *Annals of Sennacherib*, p. 62, col. iv, lines 79, 80).

²⁸ George Rawlinson, *Seven Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*, Vol. 1 (1875) 275; plate cxi, fig. 1, p. 402.

—Committee on Educational Policy

LATIN AND PRE-LEGAL EDUCATION

ACCORDING to a report presented by a committee of the American Bar Association, Latin is a recommended subject for pre-legal education.¹ No subjects are specifically required.

For many years, the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools had expressed no opinion as to what kind of pre-legal education is desirable. However, at its 1942 meeting, the Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar of the American Bar Association appointed Mr. Arthur T. Vanderbilt to prepare a report on Pre-Legal Education. This report was submitted to the Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar and to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at their September 1944 meetings, and was approved by both bodies.

Mr. Vanderbilt circulated a questionnaire and received replies from 118 distinguished lawyers and judges as to recommended subjects. (The American Bar Association is strongly opposed to required subjects.) In the replies, English language and literature received 72 recommendations; government, 71; economics, 70; American history, 70; mathe-

matics, 65; English history, 63. These recommendations are understandable, and indeed commendable, in view of the needs and problems of present-day law practise. The strong emphasis on the social sciences reflects an increasing realization on the part of lawyers and jurists that the study of law is essentially a social study. Moreover, the ability to read and write with understanding and accuracy, to understand the history of law in relation to the history of English-speaking peoples, and to appreciate the forces governing society today, is a *sine qua non* in the intelligent practise of the law.

But the subject next in order of recommendation, with 60 votes, is Latin. Among the foreign languages, Latin is far ahead; French and Spanish each received 20 votes in the poll. Summarizing this report, the Committee on Pre-Legal Education of the Association of American Colleges concludes that the recommendations of the American Bar Association call for the study of a foreign language in pre-legal education, *preferably Latin*.²

Res ipsa loquitur.

N.J.D.

NOTES

¹ "Report of a Committee on Pre-Legal Education" (Charles J. Turek, Chairman), *Association of American Colleges Bulletin* 31.1 (March, 1945) 167-169.

² For the attitude of the Association of American

Medical Colleges, cf. the exchange of letters between B. L. Ullman, President of the American Classical League, and Fred C. Zappfe, Secretary of the aforementioned association, *Classical Outlook* 18.1 (October, 1940) 7-8.

LANX SATURA

Quidquid agunt homines,
votum timor ira voluptas
gaudia discursus, nostri
farrago libelli est.

Forward to the Classics

MORE than once in the past year we have been advised, or have heard it said, that the post-war period would bring "a swing back to the classics." There is some reason for believing that a "swing" or trend is under way, but we doubt that it is back to the classics. We are inclined to believe that it is a swing *forward* to the classics.

The swing-back prediction is usually followed by a reference to the period after the last war, when the classics did enjoy a period of considerable prosperity. We are inclined to feel, however, that history is not likely to repeat itself in this instance. Following World War I, the dominant public desire was to return to "normalcy"; today, unfortunately, we know too well that we cannot go back to the good old days—those old days which meant, among other things, the traditional eight-year program in Latin through high school and college. Today we know that we are moving forward into a future that is not a little frightening.

But in the field of the classics, as elsewhere in the world, the omens are not all bad.

Rebus angustis animosus atque
fortis appare . . .

The current searching examinations of the content and purpose of liberal education and the humanities are altogether healthy—a good omen for the future of the classics if we avail ourselves of the opportunities therein presented. For the emphasis in the liberal arts is being shifted to the *tradition*, to the continuity of human experience and to the accumulated sum of that experience which is the culture of modern America on the "higher" or formal literate level.

While at first glance the "Harvard Report" may not seem to favor the Department of Classics, the following paragraphs are of considerable significance. Education must develop

a sense of heritage (the Report implies), for our culture

depends in part on an inherited view of man and society which it is the function, though not the only function, of education to pass on. . . . To study either past or present is to confront, in some form or another, the philosophic and religious fact of man in history and to recognize the huge continuing influence alike on past and present of the stream of Jewish and Greek thought in Christianity. There is doubtless a sense in which religious education, education in great books, and education in modern democracy may be mutually exclusive. But there is a far more important sense in which they work together to the same end, which is belief in man and society that we inherit, adapt, and pass on. [For] it is impossible to escape the realization that our society, like any society, rests on common beliefs and that a major task of education is to perpetuate them, [and] at bottom education is society perpetuating its spirit and inner form in a new generation.

In arguing for the view that education must be, in part at least, a process of "acculturation," one incurs the risk of being reproached with the advocacy of "indoctrination" and "fascism." To this the Report gives an answer:

. . . an axiom of that tradition itself is the belief that no current form of the received ideal is final but that every generation, indeed every individual, must discover it in a fresh form. Education can therefore be wholly devoted neither to tradition nor to experiment, neither to the belief that the ideal in itself is enough nor to the view that means are valuable apart from the ideal. It must uphold at the same time tradition and experiment, the ideal and the means, subserving, like our culture itself, change within commitment.

It is noteworthy that in a number of instances where curricular revisions have been put into operation, or promise to be put into operation shortly, the classics play an important role. In this connection we refer to the digest and commentary by D.S.W. on "The

Yale College Report" elsewhere in this issue. In a subsequent issue we shall present a report on "The Washington University Plan for the Classics"; in this plan (now in its first year of operation) all candidates for the A.B. are required to present six units in "classical culture." In both the Yale and Washington plans, it is worth noting, the offerings go considerably beyond the purely literary; in the latter plan, in addition to the more familiar course in translated Greek and Latin authors, the Department of Classics offers a course on "The Cultural Heritage of Greece and Rome," in which the emphasis is on the elements in American culture other than the literary that owe their origin and definition to Greek and Roman civilization.

We are pleased to present in this issue two guest editorials. The first, by the Reverend Paul C. Reinert, S.J., of Saint Louis University, is a summary of remarks made at a luncheon meeting of the Department of Classics, Missouri State Teachers Association, last November. The second guest editorial, by Dr. Harold B. Jaffee, of Vanderbilt University, urges a frank acceptance of the new curricular trends in the liberal arts as they affect the classics.

Campaign for the Classics

Guest Editorial

IT IS a characteristic of the human species to go on the defensive when attacked. In the past, teachers of the classics have shown that they are not exceptions to this rule. Throughout many a former century the humanistic subjects held a protected and unchallenged place in the curriculum. When these subjects began to lose favor, their exponents assumed a defensive attitude which time has proved to be erroneous. When the attack came, many a defender of the truth wrote articles establishing the intrinsic value of the classics; many a champion of the humanities publicly lamented the inroads of the natural and the social sciences, and tried to show that these were not as important as the

classics. But during this long period of curricular warfare, how many teachers sat down quietly to examine their teaching conscience in an honest, determined effort to improve their own classroom presentation of the classics? If the battle for the humanities is not going in our favor or is possibly already lost, might this not be due to the fact that we teachers have not been self-critical enough? Might it not be that, neither as individuals nor as a group, have we been sufficiently self-scrutinizing to overcome the attack in the only way it can be mastered—by a campaign for self-improvement?

I subscribe to the theory that there is one controlling factor which causes a subject to survive in an elementary, secondary, or collegiate curriculum: a resourceful, effective, dynamic teacher. Without superior teachers, subjects with the highest intrinsic value will tend to disappear. Abetted by superior teaching, a subject with the minimum intrinsic value will survive much longer than it deserves. Therefore, whether the classics will survive in the future as "living" or "dead" subjects depends entirely on whether they are taught by "living" or "dead" teachers.

Latin a Source of Ideas

What type of campaign is needed to develop "living" teachers of the classics? Better textbooks, better methods? No, fundamentally, what is needed most is a change in our own attitude towards the classics. In our teaching we must come to a much more practical realization that any language—Latin, Greek, French, Spanish—is a *source of ideas*. Barzun is right when he states in his *Teacher in America* that the tradition of philology has strangled the classics. Introducing a new language to a beginning student as though it were a science or a so-called tool subject is inevitably a fatal process. We need but turn to past experience to see the fallacy of such a procedure. Throughout history, the classics held their rightful place in the curriculum only when they were read as sources of ideas—ideas on economics, history, sociology, philosophy, and religion.

Admittedly, it is not easy for a teacher of first-year Latin to maintain constantly the attitude that he or she is attempting to provide the students with a living medium for the exchange of meaningful, vital ideas, ideas of other interesting human beings, ideas closely associated with the students' own lives. Yet a teacher who never swerves from this attitude in spite of the drudgery and monotony of elementary language teaching is destined to succeed. On the other hand, let a person enter the classroom with any other attitude towards the classics, and though he may be equipped with the most modern textbooks and methods, he is doomed to failure.

Those who are intensely eager to restore the classics to a position of honor and respect may object that the technique of the campaign here proposed is too slow and too indirect. That it is slow and indirect cannot be denied, but in this instance there is no effective technique that will produce quick results. A teacher of the classics may have to begin with just two or three students. If he or she is imbued with an enthusiastic appreciation of the basic purpose of language, this attitude will eventually be manifested in the attitude of the students. The word will spread. Next time there will be five or six in the class; the following year maybe ten or twenty. There is nothing spectacular about such a campaign, but it is the only one that guarantees permanent results.

Doctor E. K. Rand, the eminent classicist at Harvard, died recently. In an account of his death, *Time* recalled the formula he once proposed for successful Latin teaching. The teacher, he said, should be feminine, fair and twenty, and French. Obviously, this can scarcely be a practical solution for most of us in our efforts to improve our teaching of the classics, but Doctor Rand's formula does place the emphasis where it belongs—on the teacher, not on the subject, textbooks, or methods. Intrinsically, the classics will be no different tomorrow than they are today or were yesterday. But their place in tomorrow's curriculum will be determined by the outcome of a campaign for self-improvement by the ability of our profession to produce

teachers of the classics who are inspiring, enthusiastic, filled with appreciation, and motivated by the conviction that, primarily, the classics are the unfailing sources of human thought and ideals.

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The Classics' Dual Role

Guest Editorial

WITH the close of the war has come a tide in our educational affairs which teachers of the classics above all must take at the flood. During this period of reorganization of the liberal arts curriculum, departments of classics have a unique opportunity to reassert themselves. Since it is generally expected that the schedules which emerge from the fluidity of the war years will differ in many respects from their forerunners, it is especially desirable that departments of classics seize this opportunity to present themselves confidently in the new part which they have been long rehearsing and are now quite ready to play in the limelight.

The classics in the post-war curriculum can and should perform a dual role for a two-fold audience: on the one hand they must address a small and esoteric group of devoted students of the Greek and Latin texts, and on the other hand they must address a large and exoteric group of not unsympathetic students who, for many reasons, are obliged to study their classics in translation. Upon the frank acceptance and fulfilment of their double function by the departments of classics themselves depends the adequate perpetuation of our classical heritage. If they come forward now, as a matter of course, adding to their traditional schedules rich offerings in translation available for the election of the entire undergraduate body, they are likely again to operate as an integral part of the college program. Failing this, they will have to settle down, in such institutions as can afford the

luxury, alongside Aegyptology and Assyriology.

A United Front

It is in part the aim of this paper merely to urge the frank admission of both esoteric and exoteric divisions as equal partners on a united classical front facing the post-war problems of American college students. If the plea itself is just, it is reasonable to support it by cautioning against a tactical blunder which at this particular moment may prove disastrous. Neither partner at present can serve the common cause by calling special attention to the merits of his own division as against the other. Such special pleading, even when not so intended by the participants, bears the unfortunate appearance of mutual exclusiveness, and keeps in the treadmill of needless controversy talents that should be employed in constructive advance.

From those who still remain sceptical of the value of translations it would be fair to ask a certain restraint in proclaiming the superiority of the originals, at least until their younger partner has established his position securely. Admittedly the originals are superior; but yet we must acquire for the propagation of the studies we love some of the zeal of the devoted missionary who so far from refusing to instruct any but the accomplished linguist, himself learns the obscurest languages in order to impart the word of the Gospel to those who know no other. On the recoil, it is also time for the enthusiasts of courses in translation to display real assurance in the importance of their work by not continuing to apologize for it.

As far back as 1917 Professor Lane Cooper was able to write: "'English Translations of Greek and Latin Classics' is the title of a course I have for more than fifteen years given annually at Cornell University, with what the reader will pardon me for deeming excellent results." In the spring of 1940, Professor B. L. Ullman, President of the American Classical League, contributed a paper to *The Journal of Higher Education* in which he had this to say of courses in translation: "Today they are being elected by large numbers in a

few institutions and have therefore that wide influence for which it is the purpose of this paper to plead." Even if Professor Cooper and Professor Ullman stood alone among the veterans in championing such courses, the line could move confidently under their aegis. By leaving the manifesto appropriately to them, we can afford to discuss in ever greater detail the courses appearing under the new program and to offer suggestions for their expansion and improvement.

Three-Fold Approach

The succeeding remarks are intended simply to indicate three main directions that courses in translation are following and to consider one or two of the problems that they pose. The path of greatest diffusion is that whereon some of the great texts of Graeco-Roman antiquity appear in courses of general humanities. Questions that arise in connection with courses of this kind need not detain us here, since their solution must be referred to interdepartmental committees using criteria of very wide applicability. At a higher level of specialization, and entirely within the purview of the Department of Classics, is the survey of Graeco-Roman literature, in the broadest sense of that world. Selections of material and principles of interpretation constitute, perhaps, the major problems of such a course. To no small extent those problems must be solved by the interests of the department and by the divisions of the academic year at each college.

What diversity is possible is obvious from a comparison of the surveys that have been labeled Classics 117 at Princeton, and Classical Civilization 10 at Yale, or from a comparison of either with Professor Cooper's pioneer course at Cornell. I should like to call attention merely to one of the many possible orderings of the material, one which seems particularly fruitful by virtue of its implied discrimination of principles of interpretation. It is interesting to compare a reference from the Report of the Second Annual Conference of the Stanford School of Humanities (1944) to its "present curriculum in Latin and Greek

which presents "art, history, oratory, and philosophy, as well as the more familiarly recognized aspects of literature" with the statement from the latest bulletin (1945) of The College and The Divisions of the University of Chicago, announcing as the purpose of the general program in humanities "to develop competence in the analysis, understanding, and appreciation of historical, rhetorical, literary, and philosophic writings, and of works of art and music." Art and music aside, both statements find convenient a classification of literature into branches of history, oratory, philosophy, and fiction. No doubt the occurrence of this division most familiar to classical students is that in the tenth book of Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. It seems to me a highly satisfactory scheme for the selection and arrangement of our material, not only because it was formulated in the antiquity we are surveying, but because it is possible also to discover in that antiquity the enunciation of criteria leading to the discrimination of these types. Hence such criteria are particularly capable of serving for analysis and interpretation.

The Highest Level

At the third and highest level of specialization, courses are already being offered on limited and self-contained topics from ancient literature, and many more are being proposed. In a recent article Henry C. Montgomery submits that "courses with a beginning, a middle, and an end can be given in Greek poetry, prose, drama, political thought, and philosophy. . . . In the field of Latin a similar procedure can be followed with the addition of . . . Roman Law." Even more recently Frank M. Snowden suggests that "courses in translation such as the following should be considered: the Greek Drama, the Roman Drama, the Greek Historians, the Roman Historians, the Ancient Epic, Greek Philosophy, Roman Philosophy." The material of such courses is largely designated by their titles, and the matter of selection is relatively simple. An examination of these lists raises a problem of quite another kind, however,

namely, whether courses in the several subjects should be offered separately for Greece and for Rome or whether it would be preferable to combine the contributions of the two as Graeco-Roman or Classical. Generally speaking, the latter mode of presentation seems to me distinctly more organic, in virtue of these three considerations: first, that the influence of Greece was always felt in Roman thought and writing; second, that Rome transmitted the combined heritage to the modern world; and finally, that in point of *ethos* or *mores* it is proper to consider Greece and Rome as a unit over against European-American Christendom.

Furthermore, although it is true that any aspect of Greek literature prior to the close of the Punic Wars could be studied successfully without reference to Rome, after that time there would be an inevitable distortion involved in any attempt to estimate Greek culture apart from the larger politics of the Mediterranean world in which Rome came to play the leading role. Polybius, for example, would be much more intelligible in a course on Graeco-Roman Historiography than in a course restricted to the Greek Historians, while in philosophy it would be embarrassing, to say the least, to account for Lucretius or Marcus Aurelius in any but a course on Graeco-Roman Philosophy. Under the Empire, certainly, the distinction of language is not sufficiently important to serve as a basis of discrimination.

To complete the pyramid, perhaps we should mention the perfectly legitimate possibility of devoting an entire course to the works of a single classical author. Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero would undoubtedly qualify.

Because of the wide interest that is likely to be aroused in educational circles as the classics take their new stand in the post-war curriculum, I have thought it might prove helpful to subjoin a brief classified bibliography of articles on the subject in question. Some of the articles might have been placed under all three rubrics, but I listed each where it seemed to make its strongest contribution. Within the rubric the order is chronological:

I. STATEMENT OF THE POSITION

1. Taylor, J. P., "Translations of the Classics as an Aid to Classical Study," *CW* 2 (1908-09) 161-164.

2. Cooper, Lane, "A Course in Translations of the Classics," *Two Views of Education* (Yale University Press, 1922) 294-307.

3. Montgomery, H. C., "The Humanistic Role of the Ancient Classics," *The Educational Record* 25 (1944) 109-117.

4. Murphy, C. T., "The Job of Classical Education in Colleges," *CW* 39 (1945-46) 10-13.

II. ACCOUNT OF COURSES IN OPERATION

1. Oates, W. J., "The Presentation of Greek Literature in English Translation," *Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges* 24 (May, 1938) 235-241. May, 1938) 235-241.

2. Kieffer, J. S., "The Classical Revival at St. John's," *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 35 (1939-40) 144-153.

3. Ullman, B. L., "Classical Culture in the College Curriculum," *The Journal of Higher Education* 11 (1940) 189-192.

4. Caskey, J. L., "The Classics in Translation and the Liberal Arts," *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 36 (1940-41) 92-100.

5. Irwin, L. P., "Courses in Foreign Literature in Translation," *Modern Language Journal* 26 (1942) 533-538.

III. SUGGESTIONS ON SPECIAL ASPECTS

1. Bowen Kathryn, "On the Teaching of Greek Literature in English," *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 36 (1940-41) 20-34.

2. Alexander, W. H., "Adaptative Translations of the Classics," *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 38 (1942-43) 337-346.

3. Snowden, F. M., "Survey Courses in the Humanities and World Literature," *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 41 (1945-46) 25-27.

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THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW ENGLAND

ANNUAL MEETING

The Classical Association of New England will hold its fortieth annual meeting at St. George's School, Middletown, Rhode Island, on Friday and Saturday, March 29th and 30th.

The following program of papers will be presented at the meeting: "Fables from India," by Professor LeRoy C. Barret, Trinity College, Hartford; "A Point of Order," by Professor W. L. Carr, Colby College; "The Place of the Classics in Future American Education," by Dr. Alston H. Chase, Phillips Academy, Andover; "Pars Galliae Quarta," Dr. Robert H. Chastney, Montpelier High School, Vermont; "Professional Preparatory Latin—An Experiment," by Dr. Grace A. Crawford, Hamden High School, Connecticut; "Our Earliest Extant Gedichtbuch?" by Dr. Christopher M. Dawson, Yale University; "Haec Meta Viarum," by Professor Van L. Johnson, Tufts College; "The Classics in Portugal and Brazil," by Dr. Paul L. MacKendrick, Harvard University; "On Teaching Greek," by Dr. Henry Phillips, Jr., Phillips Exeter Academy; "Some Negative Prefixes in English," by Profes-

sor Lester M. Prindle, University of Vermont; "The Nationality of Horace's Parents," by Dr. Alexander H. Rice, St. George's School; "John Adams and the Classics," by Professor Dorothy M. Robathan, Wellesley College; "The Classics in the College Curriculum," by Dr. William R. Tongue, Holy Cross College.

At dinner on Friday evening the attending members of the Association will be guests of St. George's School. The evening session will be devoted to a program commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Association. Addresses for the occasion will be delivered by Dean Emeritus George H. Chase of Harvard University, Professor Emeritus Karl P. Harrington of Wesleyan University, and Dean Paul Nixon of Bowdoin College.

Anyone interested in the classics is cordially invited to attend the meeting. Further information may be obtained from the chairman of the local committee of arrangements, Dr. Alexander H. Rice, St. George's School, Middletown, Rhode Island, or from the secretary of the Association, Professor John W. Spaeth, Jr., Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut.

NOTES

VERSIFICATOR QUAM POETA MELIOR?

PROFESSOR Todd's reference in his article "Poets and Philosophers" (*THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 41, November 1945, 68), and the collection of adverse criticism from ancient sources on the orator's poetry provided by him in footnote 149, might, I think, create a quite wrong impression, especially on younger and less experienced readers of the passage; they may overlook the fact that sometimes that which does not commend itself to many of us has been otherwise judged by persons more competent than ourselves or the critics, ancient and modern, to decide. Lucretius, easily one of the world's great poets, paid Cicero's translation of the *Phaenomena* of Aratus the compliment of the very closest attention and extensive imitation. H. A. J. Munro, who knew his Lucretius if any man ever did, writes on p. 3 of the Introduction to his Notes (Vol. II, 4th ed., Cambridge, 1893) thus: "The many imitations we find in Lucretius of the few hundred extant lines of Cicero's *Aratea* prove, little as it might have been expected, that he looked upon this translation as one of his poetical models." A man who served as a poetical model for Lucretius (cf. Munro's note to 5.619) has by that very fact defeated a whole army of adverse critics. If we had the full text of Cicero's verses we should no doubt find that the imitation was just as extensive all the way through as in the part of which we have knowledge. Inspiration too is not an idea that dominates the field of ancient literature to the extent it is alleged to control modern; form is likely to have been held more important, and about that Cicero did know something.

Again, the same footnote gives the impression that Cicero was unduly vain about his own work in the field of poetry and that this is proved by his failure to quote the verse of his contemporaries. On this see Munro's

Contributions to this department in the form of brief objective notes should be sent direct to the editor, Oscar E. Nybakken, State University of Iowa, 111 Schaeffer Hall, Iowa City, Iowa.

note to 2.1092. His quotation from the older writers is profuse; that from writers of his own time he quotes not at all, save from himself, may well be a matter connected with the general literary practice of the time. Literary conventions are often odd enough things, from which it would be unwise to deduce very much. People are also apt to forget that among his close friends Cicero did not take his poetry quite as seriously as do some of his critics; cf. *ad Atticum* 1.19 *passim* and Strachan-Davidson's discussion of the whole subject in his *Cicero* (New York and London, 1894, pages 192-196).

Cicero did not profess to be a poet actually; like many another cultivated man he wrote verse. The remarkable thing about it was that to Lucretius, who must have known, it seemed to be not merely verse but poetry.

WILLIAM HARDY ALEXANDER

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SHAKESPEARE AND ST. JEROME

PORTIA: Then must the Jew be merciful.

SHYLOCK: On what compulsion must I? Tell me that.

PORTIA: The quality of mercy is not strained. . . .
Merchant of Venice IV, I.

PORTIA'S speech on mercy, really on justice seasoned with clemency, Shakespeare based upon Biblical sentiments, gleaned by him perhaps from some collection of moral utterances like the *Polyanthea*. But the bard apparently did not borrow specifically from any previous phrasings. So the latest research indicates; cf. T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakespeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke*, 2 (Urbana 1944) 611-616.

Some pleasant speculation, however, may be expended, perhaps not altogether futilely, on whether the line, "The quality of mercy is not strained," is possibly an echo of *Miseri-*

cordia vero artem non habet, occurring in Jerome's *Vita S. Hilarionis*, ch. 18.

Against such a supposition is ranged the fact that Jerome in ch. 18 is recounting Hilarion's admonitions on charity or almsgiving, as may be understood from a consideration of a few surrounding lines, any one of which is readily quotable:

Ego qui mea reliqui, cur aliena appetam?
Multis nomen pauperum occasio avaritiae est.
Misericordia vero artem non habet. Nemo
melius erogat quam qui sibi nihil reservat.

We must translate *misericordia* as if it were *largitio* or *beneficentia*. "Charity," says Hilarion in effect, "is not calculated" or "unnatural."

In favor of the supposition is the probability that, in a collection of proverbial utterances, the *misericordia . . . habet* would appear by itself, out of the context of "charity." So that one would read "mercy is not calculated." An examination of a copy of *Poly-anthea* reveals it was not included under *iustitia* or *misericordia* or *clementia*.

Yet whatever the fact of the matter, the *sententia* and the pithy remarks surrounding it are worthy to be included in some projected collection of *bons mots*, or interpolated in an old.

LEO M. KAISER

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VERGIL, NEWMAN'S GUIDE

IN a leading article in *The Times Literary Supplement* for October 6, 1945, written in commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of John Henry Newman's reception into the Roman Catholic Church, the author reminds us that memories of Vergil played a part in guiding Newman through the long period of spiritual conflict:

Yet, in spite of doubts which he still entertained about the Roman Catholic Church, he was being steadily attracted to it. From his recognition that "growth is the only evidence of life" he had seen the necessity of dogma, and, in working out his "Theory of Development" during the last year at Littlemore, he saw more and more clearly

that this carried with it the necessity for Church authority to sanction and control such development. All through the years of indecision the lines of the *Aeneid* haunted him:

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum
Tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi fata quietas
Ostendunt.

... "It was like coming into port after a rough sea" is Newman's later description of his admission to the Church.

This instance of Newman's indebtedness to the *Aeneid* at the crisis of his life furnishes further testimony to the truth of Ben Jonson's tribute in *The Poetaster* (5.1) to the universal quality of Vergil's poetry:

That, which he hath writ,
Is with such judgment laboured, and distilled
Through all the needful uses of our lives,
That could a man remember but his lines,
He should not touch at any serious point,
But he might breathe his spirit out of him.

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AUNT HET AND ARISTOPHANES

"AUNT HET," the well-known syndicated feature appearing in many daily newspapers, on December 6, 1945, in the *Shreveport (La.) Journal*, spoke the following words anent war as she gazed upon a young mother leading her two-year old son dressed in a sailor suit:

"The women o' the world could stop war quick if they'd organize and refuse to have another baby 'til the men do what's necessary to stop the killin'."

I do not know whether the creator of "Aunt Het" ever read Aristophanes or not, but classicists will recognize that "Aunt Het" has practically the same idea that the women in the *Lysistrata* had as to how wars could be stopped. The women in the *Lysistrata* succeeded; would the men today like to see the plan tried?

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HINTS FOR TEACHERS

Edited by Grace L. Beede
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A REPORT BY EUGENE S. McCARTNEY

Looking Back At the War News

IN TWO PARTS

Part II

AFTER seeing how greatly our soldiers and sailors value their badges, campaign ribbons studded with battle stars, and medals bestowed upon them for heroic or distinguished service and noting how they prize their battlefield souvenirs (*spolia militaria*), we find that passages like the following one from Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 2.11, become more significant.

Is [Sicinius Dentatus] pugnassee in hostem dicitur centum et viginti proeliis, cicatricem aversam nullam, adversas quinque et quadraginta tulisse;²¹ coronis donatus esse aureis octo, obsidionalis una, muralibus tribus, civicis quattuordecim, torquibus tribus et octoginta, armillis plus centum sexaginta, hastis duodeviginti; phaleris item donatus est quinquies viciesque; spolia militaria habuit multiuga, in his provocatoria pleraque; triumphavit cum imperatoribus suis triumphos novem.²²

As I have noted previously (*THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 39 [1943] 174-175) and as the quotation just given shows, the Romans honored as great heroes soldiers who bore scars in front and none in the back.²³ It was entirely in keeping, then, for Seneca to urge his countrymen to face unflinchingly the figurative darts of fortune that struck them in their daily lives:

Pulcherrima pars eius [fortitudinis] maximeque mirabilis illa est, non cedere ignibus, obviam ire vulneribus, interdum tela ne vitare quidem, sed pectore excipere (*Ep. Mor.* 67.6).

The present paper consists of miscellaneous items, culled largely from newspapers and magazines, that recall beliefs, news, and events of classical antiquity. Material of the same general nature appears in Dr. McCartney's previous papers in *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 38 (1943) 547-557, and 39 (1943) 172-178.

Unus est enim huius vitae fluctuantis et turbidae portus eventura contemnere, stare fidenter ac paratum tela fortunae adverso pectore excipere, non latitantem nec tergiversantem (*ibid.* 104.22).

The Italians inherit the old Roman attitude, for they show their contempt for traitors by shooting them in the back. So strong is this feeling that those who sent out the premature report of the execution of Count Ciano gave verisimilitude to it by saying that he had been killed in this way.²⁴

It is difficult for Anglo-Saxons to sympathize with the attitude of a people whose soldiers commit *hara-kiri* when hopelessly beaten rather than surrender or submit to capture, yet the Japanese idea that death is the only honorable alternative to victory is not at all new. Long ago the Goth Vittigis gave expression to it: "For noble men consider that there is only one misfortune—to survive defeat at the hands of their enemy"²⁵ (*Procopius, Histories*, 5.29.9).

One recalls that the Roman Senate refused to ransom the legionaries Hannibal took at Cannae (*Livy* 22.61.1-2). It is true that turning over money to the enemy would have helped him and hindered their own war effort, but they could not forget the traditional stern attitude of the Romans toward captives—"exemplum civitatis minime in captivos iam inde antiquitus indulgentis."

Another story about these captives was known to *Livy* (*ibid.* 5). According to it, the Senate deliberated whether or not to admit

into the city ten of them who had been sent from Cannae on some mission not clearly indicated. Their attitude reminds us of the Japanese code that capture means disgrace for both a soldier and his family and makes it impossible for him to return home.

Our soldiers in Africa were warned that the wearing of skirts by a man was no reflection on his manhood. The Romans, too, had but scanty respect for the valor of soldiers clad in flowing robes, and it would seem that even Seneca had to struggle against such a prejudice, for he wrote (*Ep. Mor.* 33.2): "Apud me Epicurus est et fortis, licet manuleatus sit. Fortitudo et industria et ad bellum prompta mens tam in Persas quam in alte cinctos cadit."²⁶ The second sentence might well have been a reminder given to expeditionary troops by a Roman office of war information.

If we may believe a newspaper item, Winston Churchill both praised and blamed a picturesque general in this terse sentence: "... is indomitable in defense, unconquerable in attack, and insufferable in victory."²⁷ In classical times there were many great men who, to use Kipling's words in "If," could not "meet with Triumph and Disaster and treat those two imposters just the same." One of them was Cicero, of whom Asinius Pollio said: "Utinam moderatius secundas res et fortius adversas ferre potuisset! Namque utraeque cum evenerant ei, mutari eas non posse rebatur."²⁸

Many Greeks and Romans gave expression to ideas like these:

"Of all victories the greatest and best is self-conquest" (Plato, *Laws* 626 E).

"Bis vincit qui se vincit in victoria" (Publius Syrus).²⁹

"Aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem, non secus in bonis" (Horace, *Carmina* 2.3.1-2).

"Sapiens et bonum ferre potest modice et malum fortiter aut leviter."³⁰

During triumphal processions in Rome a slave kept reminding the conquering hero, who was afraid of Nemesis, that he was but

mortal. Our own beloved General Eisenhower needed no such exhortation amid the honors bestowed on him, for in London he said:

"Humility must always be the portion of any man who receives acclaim earned in the blood of his followers and the sacrifices of his friends. . . . They [the honors paid to a commander] cannot soothe the anguish of the widow or orphan whose husband or father will not return."

In the early days of the war many English children were brought to us across the Atlantic Ocean in order to spare them its horrors. So far as I am aware, the longest flight of ancient refugees for a similar purpose followed Alexander's attack upon Tyre. An intensely human record of the event has been preserved for us by Curtius 4.3.20:

Non tamen defecere animis Tyrri, quamquam ab ingenti spe destituti erant, sed coniuges liberosque devehendos Carthaginem tradiderunt, fortius quicquid accideret laturi si carissimam sui partem periculi communis extra sortem habuissent.

Early in 1939, while the Italians were still raising a clamor for possession of Corsica and Tunisia, Premier Edouard Daladier made a tour of French possessions in the Mediterranean. The following item³¹ in regard to it has some interest for classicists:

At Corsica the French used a neat bit of pagan lore to warn off the Italians. As the Premier was being ecstatically hailed by the fiery islanders in Ajaccio and Bastia, French warships circled the island. No Corsican—and no Italian—could have failed to get the point that this was a modern version of the old Norse magic of surrounding a spot with fire (in this case, navy steel) to keep out evil (Italians).

I see no reason why Italians should have associated this incident exclusively with old Norse magic. The classics abound in examples of the use of the circle to keep evil away. A protecting furrow was drawn about the site of Rome at the founding of the city, and the well-known ceremony of the Ambarvalia was apotropaic. As the Romans conducted the Suovetaurilia about their lands they prayed to Mars pater: "... uti tu morbos visos invisosque, viduertatem vastitudinem-

que, calamitates intemperiasque prohibeas, defendas averruncasque. . . ."³²

During the war we saw repeated several times a kind of folk tale to the effect that the British would hold Gibraltar only so long as the Barbary apes remained there.³³ A version of it appeared in *The Saturday Evening Post*, 216 (April 8, 1944) 6:

One recent atrocity story from Europe relates that the apes on Gibraltar are being poisoned by German spies.

If such a risk is being taken by Berlin, it is probably because of The Superstition. There is a tradition, young, as folklore goes, that if the apes leave the Rock, so will the British go.³⁴

Many cities of classical antiquity had talismans on which their security was supposed to rest.³⁵ When Alexander was besieging Tyre a citizen dreamed that he saw Apollo leaving the city. Thereupon the Tyrians bound the statue of the god with a golden chain to keep him from deserting.³⁶ The most famous talisman was, of course, the Palladium,³⁷ the statue of Pallas Athena, on the safekeeping of which depended the salvation of Troy. Ovid³⁸ makes Apollo say of it:

"Aetheream servate deam, servabitur urbem:
imperium secum transferet illa loci."

In numerous places in the classics one finds mention of the electric phenomenon that we call "St. Elmo's fire." Pliny the Elder, who was an admiral, tells us (*Nat. Hist.* 2.101) that he saw it alighting on the yards and other parts of the ship, like birds hopping from perch to perch. It was observed many times during the recent conflict.³⁹ In one of the three specially designed Superforts (two of which had no bombs) that carried out the atomic bomb mission by which Nagasaki was destroyed there rode a science writer for the *New York Times*, William L. Laurence. The following paragraphs from his account (September 9, 1945) are of absorbing interest to me:

I noticed a strange eerie light coming through the window high above in the navigator's cabin, and as I peered through the dark all around us I saw a startling phenomenon. The whirling giant propellers became great luminous discs of blue flame.

The same luminous blue flame appeared on the plexiglass windows in the nose of the ship, and on the tips of the giant wings it looked as though we were riding the whirlwind through space on a chariot of blue fire.

... One's thoughts dwelt anxiously on the precious cargo in the invisible ship ahead of us. Was there any likelihood or danger that this electric tension in the atmosphere all about us might set it off?

I express my fears to Capt. Bock, who seems nonchalant and unperturbed at the controls. He quickly reassures me:

"It is a familiar phenomenon seen often on ships. I have seen it many times on bombing missions. It is known as St. Elmo's fire."

The present generation has witnessed the emergence of unworthy leaders from humble surroundings and their gradual acquisition of unlimited powers. The ancients, too, were familiar with dictators, and the words of Plato (*Republic* 8.565-569) in regard to their rise have a familiar ring. He recounts how people blindly follow a man who professes to champion their rights and how, after they have elevated him, he gives up the role of protector, kills or banishes his fellow citizens, and becomes an absolute tyrant with a body-guard. He stirs up war in order to necessitate his continued leadership and, unwilling to tolerate opposition from either friend or foe, purges those who stand in his way.

The part that the Atlantic Ocean on the east and the wildernesses to the west have played in affording our country time to develop with almost no interference from abroad has a counterpart in the role of the Alps in allowing Rome time to grow into a great power. Cicero (*De Prov. Cons.* 14.34) thus gives expression to this thought:

Alpibus Italiam munierat antea natura non sine aliquo divino numine. Nam si ille aditus Gallorum immanitati multitudinique patuisset, numquam haec urbs summo imperio domicilium ac sedem praeberisset. Quae iam licet considant.

Just as the Romans ultimately learned that not even the Alps provided safety, so we have had forced upon us a realization that no bodies of water or other obstacles are large enough to make us secure from attack. In a

speech delivered to Congress on April 16, 1945, President Truman impressed this fact upon us: "In this shrinking world it is futile to seek safety behind geographical barriers."

Before the tide of battle in World War II had changed in favor of the United Nations their great leaders proclaimed that "unconditional surrender"⁴⁰ would be the only basis for peace with the Axis powers. The Romans did not have so terse an expression, but they could be equally severe. In 181 B.C. Aemilius Paulus informed Ligurian ambassadors that he could not make peace "nisi cum deditis" (Livy 40.25.3). According to a bracketed passage in Curtius (4.11.23), just before the battle of Arbela Alexander the Great gave a peremptory message to the emissaries of Darius: "Proinde aut deditionem hodie aut in crastinum bellum paret." In the Potsdam Declaration the Big Three sternly said: "We shall brook no delay."

Our deliberate procedure for trying war criminals is in striking contrast to Alexander the Great's summary method of dispatching such business (Curtius 4.8.10-11):

Oneravit hunc dolorem [Alexandri] nuntius mortis Andromachi, quem praefecerat Syriae: vivum Samaritae cremaverant. Ad cuius interitum vindicandum, quanta maxima celeritate potuit contendit, advenientique sunt traditi tanti sceleris auctores. Andromacho deinde Memnona substituit, adfectis supplicio qui praetorem interemerant, tyrannos . . . popularibus suis tradidit.

Just before the end of the European phase of the war Henry Morgenthau proposed that Germany be stripped of her industry and converted into a completely agricultural nation.⁴¹ The idea seems novel, but continued opposition to the Goths after their capture of Rome in 547 B.C. led Totila to threaten to make a sheep pasture of the city (Procopius, *Histories* 7.22.7). One recalls that, when the accumulation of refuse through the centuries finally covered the Roman Forum, it did become a pasture land. We read that "herds of cattle from the Campagna settled down on this historic spot and the common name for it was Campo Vaccino, while the name Forum Romanum was so far forgotten that

for centuries it was erroneously believed to be in an entirely different locality."⁴²

The demonstrations of joy, accompanied by bouquets, gifts of fruit, and even kisses, with which Allied soldiers were greeted as they swept the Germans out of occupied countries have some parallel in Roman history. Livy (27.45.7, 10) thus describes roadside scenes while the army of Gaius Claudius Nero, which had been keeping watch on Hannibal in southern Italy, was making forced marches to join another Roman army facing Hasdrubal at the Metaurus:

And in fact they [legionaries] were marching everywhere between lines of men and women who had poured out from the farms on every side, and amidst their vows and prayers and words of praise. Defenders of the state, men called them, champions of the city of Rome and of the Empire. In their weapons and their right hands, they said, were placed their own safety and freedom, and those of their children. . . . Then they vied with each other in invitations and offers and in importuning them to take from them in preference to others whatever would serve the men themselves and their beasts; they heaped everything upon them generously.⁴³

In an article in the *New York Times Magazine* (September 3, 1944, p. 40) a shrewd observation was made concerning the miscarriage of German ambitions: "Hitler's biggest, his fundamental, mistake was in underestimating the depth of the human yearning for freedom, which is as instinctive as the drawing of breath." A columnist thus describes the results of the Germans' efforts to nazify the Norwegian: "They only succeeded in teaching him to love his country with a passionate love which nothing can quench—and to love freedom even more."

Devastating as were German assaults upon European countries, no nation made a more heroic stand against them or suffered more tragic consequences than the Greeks. They came by their bravery and love of liberty quite naturally, as a speech by one of their ancestors shows:⁴⁴

Hegesippus . . . in a public address was inciting the Athenians against Philip, when someone in the Assembly commented audibly, "You are

bringing on war." "Yes, by Heaven, I am," said he, "and black clothes and public funerals and orations over the graves of the dead, if we intend to live as free men and not to do what is enjoined upon us by the Macedonians."

The philosopher Seneca understood far better than Hitler the profound love of human beings for freedom and also the heavy price they are willing to pay to keep it. In *Epistulae Morales* he says:

Fortitudo contemptrix timendorum est; terribilia et sub iugum libertatem nostram mittentia despicit, provocat, frangit (88.29).

Perit libertas nisi illa contemnimus quae nobis sub iugum inponunt (85.28).

Iniuriosum est raptu vivere at contra pulcherrimum mori raptu (70.28).

One of the sententiae of Publilius Syrus has a thoroughly modern ring: "Ubi libertas cecidit, audet libere nemo loqui."

In his V-J Day Speech President Truman showed once more how fundamental is love of liberty:

It was the spirit of liberty which gave us our armed strength and which made our men invincible in battle. We now know that that spirit of liberty, the freedom of the individual, and the personal dignity of man, are the strongest and toughest and most enduring forces in all the world.

Sallust remarks (*Bell. Cat.* 2) that a nation is easily preserved by the exercise of the same virtues by which it was founded: "Nam imperium facile iis artibus retinetur quibus initio partum est." That the Spirit of 1776 in our own history is equaled by the Spirit of 1945 is shown by the justly famous picture of the flag raising on Iwo Jima. It symbolizes the uttermost in devotion and sacrifice, for one of the six Marines who enacted it was later wounded and three were killed. The virtues of the founders of our country survive, and our nation still lives.

NOTES

²¹ Compare Curtius 4.14.6: "Spondere pro se, quot cicatrices, totidem corporis decora." Alexander spoke these words to his soldiers just before the battle of Arbela.

²² An interesting explanation of many Roman military awards is given by Aulus Gellius, *op. cit.*, 5.6. The meaning of our military ribbons and medals has been explained to us many times.

²³ Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 2.15.7: "Nam et Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius, cum scissa veste cicatrices quas is pro patria pectore adverso suscepisset ostendit, non orationis habuit fiduciam sed oculis populi Romani vim attulit quem illo ipso aspectu maxime motum in hos ut absolveret reum creditum est.

²⁴ Count Ciano was granted his final request that he be allowed to die facing the executioners and without being blindfolded.

²⁵ H. B. Dewing's translation in the Loeb Classical Library.

²⁶ Cf. *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 38 (1943) 548-549.

²⁷ I am omitting the name of this popular general because Churchill's love of epigrammatic statement may have led him to be less than just.

²⁸ Quoted by LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, *Suasoriae* 6.24.

²⁹ Cf. Proverbs 16.32: "... and he that ruleth his spirit is better than he that taketh a city."

³⁰ Varro, as quoted by Nonius (Lindsay's edition, 2.542).

³¹ *Time* 33 (Jan. 16, 1939) 21.

³² Cato, *De Agri Cultura* 141.2.

³³ For a story about a tree on which the safety of Singapore was supposed to depend see *THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL* 39 (1943) 172.

³⁴ Cf. John Valentine and R. Caldwell, "Gibraltar during Three Great Wars," *Travel* 85 (September, 1945) 34: "It is the local belief that should they [the apes] die out, the British would lose their hold on the Rock."

³⁵ See, for example, Sir James G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, 4.433-434.

³⁶ Curtius 4.3.21-22.

³⁷ It is noteworthy that as a common noun the word "palladium" now signifies anything on which the preservation of a nation, an institution, or a privilege is supposed to depend.

³⁸ *Fasti* 6.427-428 (359-360).

³⁹ In an article called "St. Elmo's Fire," *Classical Weekly* 36 (1942) 3, I have given another wartime example of the occurrence of this phenomenon, together with some references to the literature on the subject.

⁴⁰ Grant's phrase at Fort Donelson was "unconditional and immediate surrender."

⁴¹ One provision of the Potsdam Declaration reads as follows: "In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries."

⁴² C. Huelsen, *The Forum and the Palatine* (translated by Helen H. Tanzer) 54-55. In *Ruins and Excavations of Ancient Rome*, 243-244, R. Lanciani says that gardens and orchards occupied the site.

⁴³ Translation of Frank Gardner Moore in the Loeb Classical Series.

⁴⁴ *Moralia* 187E. F. C. Babbitt's translation in the Loeb Classical Library.

THE YALE COLLEGE REPORT

A Digest and Commentary Prepared at the Direction of the Committee on Educational Policies of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South

IN the spring of 1945 the Committee on the Course of Study for Yale College presented its report to the faculty of Yale; the report was adopted. It represented a study by the committee designed to remedy certain curricular conditions at Yale, particularly the "chaos" created by too great adherence to the elective system and by some half-measures of adjustment which had not resulted in a satisfying program for Yale men. Thus, while the Harvard Report, *General Education in a Free Society*,¹ was a "venture into the vast field of American educational experience in quest of a concept of general education that would have validity for the free society which we cherish,"² the Yale College Report aimed rather at adjustment for local problems in the Yale curriculum. Both reports are efforts at adjustment to new and broader concepts of education.³

This report is now available in mimeographed form, and it is well worth the serious study it takes to understand and evaluate it. In its broad divisions it contains the history of curriculum change at Yale, the proposals for the Standard Program, the Scholars of the House Program, and the Experimental Program. It is not assumed that this is the final word but rather that there shall be continuous revision as education shall demand. Not only did the main committee as a nucleus continue work for a number of years, but they were helped by other members of the faculty from time to time, and the departments of the College made adjustments within themselves.

The second section of the Report is most interesting to all of us. It concerns the General Provisions for the Bachelor of Arts degree, in which we find outlined the Standard Program with its Basic Studies, Program of

Distribution, Requirements of the Major Field, and Summer Reading. It is stated that this section is to be published later in the form of a pamphlet.

The third section consists of Exhibits for the Standard Program: EXHIBIT A: Systematic Thinking; EXHIBIT B: Modern Language through the Level of 30 (a course so-called); EXHIBIT C: Science I, II, and III; EXHIBIT D: The Ancient World; EXHIBIT E: Courses in Integration; EXHIBIT F: Major Subjects and Fields for the Candidate for the B.A. Degree; EXHIBIT G: Summer Reading.

A fourth section outlines the Experimental Program in respect to its Basic Phase, which concerns the work of the first two years. This is followed by an Epitome of the Courses in the Basic Phase of the Experimental Program: Mathematics, Literature, Philosophy I, Language I, Science I, Social Science, Historical Perspective, Philosophy II, Language II, Biological Sciences.

A fifth section is devoted to the Field Majors in an Advanced Studies Program in the Experimental Programs E-P II. Here are discussed the Goals of the Major Field, Organization of the Field Majors, Comprehensive Examination and Senior Essays. This includes an outline of the work to be done in I: The Field Major in the History of the West; II: Field Major in Studies of Society; III: Field Major in Literature and the Arts; IV: Field Major in General Science; V: Field Major in Philosophies and Religions.

The sixth and last section deals with the Scholars of the House in which are discussed Selection of Candidates, Privileges of the Accepted Candidates, Duties of the Candidate, Awards and Penalties, and Administration.

That part of the Report (pp. 1-3) dealing

with the historical background of Yale's curricular problems from 1884 to 1944, the date of this study, need not be discussed in this review. For a period of sixty years, Yale College has emphasized successively elective opportunity, planned breadth and distribution, and finally, concentration in the major field. What the Committee on the Course of Study has tried to do is to strike a reasonable balance between these three elements. It has "endeavored to provide for the Yale undergraduate seeking the Bachelor of Arts degree programs of study which will equip him to live magnanimously and intellectually in the modern world. . . . We have tried to avoid the reactionary curricula which have been publicly proposed and have gained some suffrage. We have, on the other hand, tried to strike order into the chaos of the free elective system which still finds its most notable support at the place of its origin. . . . Our programs owe something to Mr. Hutchins, something to Mr. Stringfellow Barr, something to the so-called Progressive Colleges. . . . We have tried to provide curricula which will be as adequate for our times as the famous curricula of Greece, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance were for their time."

The Standard Program was drawn up for the majority of Yale students. The cardinal principle of this program is "to provide the student, in school and college, with the fundamental studies, to acquaint him with the great fields of knowledge, to make him a reasonably competent person in a limited field, and to bring him to that maturity which ought to distinguish the young graduate of Yale."

Dangers of Provincialism

In emphasizing the need of proficiency in a modern language, the Committee observed, "Now, more than ever, must we educate men who are free from provincialism. We expect our graduates, as heretofore, to play their part in the nation and the world, in statecraft and in learning. Even if they stay at home in business, the culture and civilization of another great people must remain accessible to them at first hand." For the devel-

opment of Systematic Thinking, the Committee provides for the student "a choice of mathematical reasoning, logical reasoning, and linguistic reasoning through courses in Mathematics, Philosophy, and Linguistics, respectively. Each of these subjects has a content of its own of great value to the student, but the emphasis is here put upon the formal training in the systematic processes of three kinds of abstract thought."

In the second phase of the Standard Program, the Program of Distribution, the Committee outlines the requirements of six sciences, which shall "introduce the student to the great fields of knowledge which make up modern learning. . . . The plan for the sciences is an ambitious one and if carried through will provide the College with a program which will be unique in its combination of breadth and thoroughness. These courses should prove to be a liberating experience to the student. The object of these courses is the increase of human understanding."

The Classics Requirement

After explaining the purpose of the Social Sciences and emphasizing the need of correlating this branch with history and philosophy, the Committee engages in a discussion of another requirement, "the familiar one of the Classics. It should help to provide, among other things, the historical perspective which is the enemy of temporal provincialism. Some students will satisfy this requirement in the ancient way of continuing their study of Latin or Greek. Most of them, however, will take a year's course in Classical Civilization. Ancient History and Greek and Roman Political Ideas have been made full year courses at the request of the Department of Classics. With the cooperation of the Classics Department new arrangements have been instituted in this field whereby the student may in the second term point his studies of the ancient world in the direction of his major field, be it Literature, History, Art, Philosophy, or Political Ideas. The choice allowed ought to stimulate interest and make the studies in this field something more than a mere requirement."

In discussing the requirement of courses in literature, music, and art, the interesting observation was made that "these studies bear so directly on the eternal and most intimate problems of man, both as an intellectual and as an emotional being, that they do more than other studies to mature the student's whole nature They are often the most valuable courses in a liberal curriculum."

The Committee has made abundant provision in its curricular offerings for the competent student. The Committee "holds as a principle of first importance that the education of the student must be viewed as a whole, including school and college, and it has set up a reasonable system of anticipations whereby excellent work in many subjects in school and on the entrance tests is recognized as satisfying the requirements in those fields. Accordingly, it is possible for the very able student to anticipate five, or even six, of the nine requirements. A considerable number will be able to anticipate two or three. Above all else, it is necessary to give the student work that will stretch him to his capacity.

Summer Reading

"One additional feature of the Standard Program is the requirement for Summer Reading throughout the student's career in College." To this commentator, and perhaps to some readers who are accustomed to the stepped-up four-semester year, this "feature" seems quaint, smacking of those long, lazy summers of the nineties. But the Committee insists that "this will add appreciably to the student's education, but it may seem to some difficult to enforce. *A little timely severity at the Sophomore level will do wonders* [the italics are mine], and the Dean's office is prepared to apply it."

A proposal of the Committee that ought to command wide approval is that contained in the Experimental Program. This program is opened to a limited number of ambitious students who do not care to cool their heels while the rank and file are catching up. In most every curriculum change known to the writer, provision is made chiefly for the less

capable half of the student body. Here, however, without departing too far "from the main stream of the curriculum" an opportunity is afforded to the more capable student to stretch his stride and engage in a type of advanced work which will challenge his intellectual powers.

Teachers of classical literature will be interested in the sections devoted to Literature and Language in the Epitome of the Courses in the Basic Phase of the Experimental Program. The class in Literature will meet one hour a week in a common lecture, "at which time the necessary historical and other background information will be presented. For the discussion of the week's assignment, which thus becomes central and critical, the group will be divided into four two-hour seminars of ten men each." The work for two terms will include the literature of the Old Testament (5 weeks); the literature of tragedy, Greek, Shakespearian, and Lyric, as well as the tragedy in prose fiction (12 weeks); the literature of the epic (8 weeks); the literature of the comedy (7 weeks). Our space is too limited here to show the rich offerings in the Field Major in Literature and the Arts and the Field Major in Philosophies and Religions.

The Ancient World

Of interest also to teachers of the classics is Exhibit D: The Ancient World. Let me quote the Committee verbatim:

"The Committee on the Course of Study proposes that this requirement be met in one of the following three ways. The first of these is by taking in college an advanced course in Latin or Greek (at the level of 30 or higher), as at present. The second is by taking a full year course in Ancient History (C.C. 20), or in Greek or Roman Political Ideas (C.C. 21). The third way is as follows:

FIRST TERM: Classical Civilization, the Greek World. History and Literature, but not including Greek Science and Philosophy.

SECOND TERM: One of the following term courses:

1. Greek and Roman Literature—The Epic
2. Greek and Roman Literature—The Drama
3. The Art of the Greek World in the Archaic and Classical Eras.
4. Greek and Roman Economic and Social Life.

5. Ancient Philosophy

6. Hellenic and Judaic Religious Ideas.

Through this series of courses the Ancient World is put in a pivotal position in the curriculum. Almost all of the candidates for the B.A. degree would pass through this field, as at present, but the differentiation in the second term in the Classical Civilization courses would allow the student to point his Classical requirement towards his special interests."

Scholars of the House

Under the guidance of faculty advisors, students who, at the end of the Sophomore Year, have attained an average of 80 or better in the work of their first two years, will be permitted to "assume a more active direction of their own education than they may in the Standard or the first Experimental program." The student must maintain this average of 80 in order to stay in this group which is called Scholars of the House. And if he does superior work in both the required essay and the examination, he will be recommended to the Committee on Honors as worthy of the designation "Scholar of the House with exceptional distinction."

The outstanding implication of this Yale

Report is that Yale College intends to train leaders in our democracy. Unlike the inescapable objective of state-supported universities, which is to educate every young man and woman regardless of educability, Yale expects her graduates to be leaders in this new world of science and technology, to be leaders in statecraft, equipped with knowledge of the philosophy and techniques of political and religious action as recorded in history and literature.

Although this Report offers no "must" to teachers in the secondary field, it challenges them to make a careful selection of their trainees and send along to New Haven only Privates First Class.

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NOTES

¹ Cf. THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 41 (November 1945) 87-89.

² Ibid. 87.

³ This Report provides for the adoption of the Standard Program in the fall of 1946; Scholars of the House Program in 1948; the Experimental Program as early as 1947 if there is a full normal Freshman class.

—Loci Classici

THE ELEPHANT

ELEPHANTORUM duo genera sunt, alterum Africum, alterum Indicum. Genus Africum multo latius antiquitus inventum est, quippe quod dentium pretiosorum causa citra deserta Libyca ad perniciem foede reductum sit. Huius generis Africi erant elephantī, e Mauretania transvecti, qui primi bellis Punicis Romae visi sunt. Africanus aliquanto minor est atque Indicum pavere dicitur. Plinius maior scripsit in iis esse ingenium, iustitiam, memoriam, religionemque quandam: morem enim esse iis congregatis lunam novam venerari; famam esse quandam in senectute eum qui juvenis rector suus fuisset agnovisse; in genus suum ut impetum faciant nullo modo lacessi posse. Quod ad ingenium pertinet, nemo est quin sciat muneribus difficilibus fungi facile doceri possint.

Summa prudentia virtuteque sunt neque bestias ferocissimas timent sed mures odisse atque minimo porcorum stridore terreri dicuntur. Maxime autem propter magnitudinem mollitiemque nasi mirandi sunt. Scilicet hic Graece *proboscis*, Latine *manus*, Anglice *trunk* appellatur, sed nomine mutato non mutatur res ipsa. Nasus est nasus. Unus igitur omnibus ex animalibus naso frontem fricare auremque suam fodere, in os nasum immittere, quin etiam usque in ventrem insinuare atque aquam inde eductam supra caput spargere calore aestivo oppressus potest. Quattuor quidem ventres habet, qua de causa dolor ventris utpote quadruplus iis praecipue pertimescendus est.

Anon., *Liber Animalium*

A CHAT WITH JOHN AND MARY—

WHO ARE GOING TO SCHOOL

The High School's Obligation To YOU

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP IN THE GREAT WORLD OF YESTERDAY—TODAY—TOMORROW

Let's Suppose

YOU, John and Mary, are going to high school. I know that you are alert, intelligent Americans, average in most things, and better than average in some things.

Let's suppose that you have the average American's ability to enjoy working at something you understand—something that seems to be worth while.

I know that you take school seriously, even if all of us sometimes feel that school is just another one of those things that all people have to go through when they are young, like mumps or measles, only lasting longer and less fun.

Why are you going to school? What should your high school do for you?

Let's not try to answer that right away. Instead, let's try to look at your school in various ways and from different points of view. That is the roundabout way, but often the best way to get a good answer.

Investing in Education

First of all, suppose we look at your school

(Prepared by Norman J. DeWitt, Washington University (Saint Louis) under the direction of the Committee on Educational Policies of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South.

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as though it were a place where you make an investment. You know what an investment is: you take a sum of money and buy a farm, or a filling station, or some shares of stock in a company, or a government bond. But no matter what you do with your money, you expect to make a profit. No person ever knowingly makes a bad investment.

You know that some investments bring in a profit right away, and others pay off slowly over a long period of time. A "get-rich-quick" scheme may promise to make you a millionaire in a few weeks; on the other hand, a government bond will not pay a high rate of interest, but it will pay that interest safely for a good many years. (Which is the safer investment?)

Many thoughtful people pay a small sum each year to an insurance company for an annuity. These investors are looking ahead twenty or thirty years to the day when they are going to retire. Then the money that they have put into the annuity will be paid back to them after their regular wages have stopped, and they will have a steady income as long as they live.

Government bonds and annuities are both sound investments because you know you will get your money back. Many people lose their money in bad investments because they listen to wildcat schemes which promise to make them rich overnight.

Now, at school, instead of investing money, you invest your time and your work—the most valuable things you have. Are you going to look to the future and make a safe long-term investment? And in return, what will your high school give you by way of profit and income?

Learn to Earn and Learn to Live

Certainly one of the things you can invest in is a vocational skill—one that you can sell as soon as you have mastered it. That is, you can make money right away because you can do something special, like typing, or book-keeping, or radio repairing. This kind of learning, whether it is something comparatively simple, like office work or one of the industrial arts, or something more specialized, like law, or engineering, or nursing, or dietetics, is very important, because you will want to earn your way in the world. Your high school and college will help you to do this.

But many teachers and others who are interested in your future feel that the investments in education that we have just mentioned do not constitute a complete education. There is more to life than merely earning a living. In fact, there are two things school can show you: how to earn a living, and how to live.

What is this other kind of school work that helps you to live after you have earned your living?

Questions in Education

LET us answer that question by asking another question: What is an educated person like? If we can answer this second question, perhaps we shall have an answer to the first question.

Here is one easy answer to the question about the educated person: An educated person is always trying to understand what he sees and hears and reads. (Or the other way around: if he doesn't try to understand, he will never be educated.)

Education can help you to find the answers to some of the important questions that men have been trying to understand for centuries. But before you can understand the answers to the important questions, you must have the desire to know about the world, about your fellow-men, and the great things men have done in the past and are doing today. With this desire, education can be yours for the asking—education in the widest sense.

Have you ever noticed how great ideas, or great religious or political or social move-

ments, are represented by symbols? We all know what the cross stands for. We remember very well what the swastika once stood for. Well, if we wished to have a banner for education, we might very properly put on it just one great symbol, like this:

?

since the sum of education is based on questions that men have been asking for hundreds and thousands of years.

We have been speaking as though education could give you all the answers. Unfortunately, this is not true. Actually education can give you only some of the answers: the important thing is that truly great education can show you what some of the questions are. These great questions have been part of education for centuries, and each generation attempts to find the answers in its own way.

The High Place

Or we might put it this way: Most people who have lived in a city for some time know their way around. They are not likely to get lost when they are walking or driving because they have learned through long experience where to find the main streets and where they lead. But who has the surer sense of direction: the person who always walks, and never leaves the pavement, or the person who has been up in a high place, on a hilltop or a tall building or best of all, in an airplane?

Of course, the person who has been in the high place has the surer sense of direction; he has seen the wide view; he recognizes the landmarks and their relation to one another and he can never be lost for long when he walks in the streets again. The educated person has also been in the high place; he has seen the wide view, and he can never be truly lost when he walks the streets of life.

How to be Human

ONCE a great scientist (his name was Aristotle) was asked, "What is the difference between a person who is educated and one who is not?" His reply was, "The person who is educated differs from the uneducated person as much as a conscious person differs

from an unconscious person." That is to say, the unconscious person does not know anything; he does not even know that he is unconscious. The uneducated person does not know anything, either; he doesn't care about knowing anything; in fact, he does not even know that he is conscious—conscious in the sense that he is a living human being who has the power to learn and think and understand.

The ancient Greeks, of whom Aristotle was one, believed that men are set apart from other living creatures because they have minds, because they can remember, reason things out, and plan for the distant future. This is what makes people human. If men do not try to think and understand, they are not human—in fact, they are not men at all; they are simply clever animals.

The American Way of Thinking

Now, as a matter of fact, this Greek way of thinking is also a good American way of thinking, although we do not put it in quite the same words. We believe in freedom. The Greeks (and the Romans, who followed in the Greek way of thinking) believed that men must think and be guided by reason, and if they think rightly they will be free.

The Greeks and Romans also believed that each man must think for himself. This means, of course, that no one can tell him what to think. When each citizen is doing his own thinking, it follows that he must live in a well-ordered society where individuals (you and I) are free and amount to something. The Greeks and Romans, just like ourselves, believed that the only society in which men and women can live as free, thinking individuals is a constitutional republic, or a democracy in which men are governed by good laws.

The Greeks and Romans would have understood very well what President Roosevelt and the American people meant by the "Four Freedoms." They believed that men and women must be free from worry about money; that is, they must have economic security. They must be healthy, so that they can live as Nature intended they should, and enjoy life.

But, according to the ancient way of think-

ing, the greatest freedom of all is freedom from ignorance, for upon this freedom all other freedoms depend. Ignorant people cannot live a good life.

Ignorant people are not free; they are the slaves of the world about them because they are ignorant and afraid. Freedom from fear is made possible by knowledge, and this freedom was defined by those ancient Greeks, who said that there is a reasonable explanation for everything, and that it is the business of human beings to discover this reasonable explanation.

In these modern times it is still the business of human beings (you and me) to discover the reasonable explanation. To be free—to be good Americans—it is our business to try to learn, to think, to understand.

Education and Books

EVERYONE knows that education is based mainly on books of one kind or another. And you will hear people say, "Oh, what good are books! Just a lot of dry, musty old writers! What we need is something practical, something connected with everyday life!"

This sounds good, but is it true? You know that it is not true.

Back in 1933, when the Nazis came into power in Germany, they publicly banned and burned a great many "liberal"¹ books. Why did the Nazis destroy these books? They were afraid of "liberal" books and the ideas that were written down in them. (Are you afraid of books and ideas?)

Tools and Symbols

READING, thinking, and understanding depend upon the use of certain tools or symbols. For example, when you write " $5 \times 2 = 10$," you are using symbols. " \times " is a symbol representing the process of multiplication.

In algebra we go a step further in using symbols. For example, in $a + b = y$, the a and b and the y are really symbols of symbols. The techniques of engineering and science through which we attempt to control nature

¹ The English word "liberal" is related to the Latin adjective *liber*, meaning "free."

² Did you know?

and build the modern world are based on the use of such symbols. The special language which uses these symbols of quantities and processes is called "mathematics."

There is another system of symbols that we use in thinking and understanding. You are looking at symbols right now. These letters and combinations of letters are merely queer marks on paper unless we regard them as symbols. That is, they stand for, or represent, words. But words themselves are symbols, or sounds, or funny noises,² we make with our throats and mouths. The word "book" is not a book; it (that is, the noise *book*) merely stands for, or suggests, or means, a book in our system of verbal symbols. "System of verbal symbols" is another way of saying "language."

Language and Thinking

A moment ago I told you about the old Greek and Roman belief that the power to think and reason and understand is the essential characteristic of real men and women; that is, free human beings. I said that this is also part of the American belief in freedom, although we do not put it quite the same way. The use of symbols is also a human characteristic. Symbols and thinking go together. Language and thought go together. If you have no thoughts, you have nothing to say, and if you do not have skill in using language symbols, you are not likely to do any important thinking or have any important ideas.

Language study means writing and thinking. *Language is the most important thing you can study: it is the key to all other studies which are also essential in true education.*

Language in All Subjects

When we organize education into classes and courses, it is necessary to pretend that each subject is quite different and distinct from every other subject. This often leads us into queer opinions about what education actually means.

For example, we all have the idea that language is taught only in courses that are labelled "Language," such as English or

Spanish or Latin. We naturally think that the studies called "Social Sciences" or "Social Studies" have nothing to do with language, but deal only with subjects that are related to the study of society.

As a matter of fact, however, in a Spanish class you are likely to learn a good deal of geography, both of the kind you find on maps, and of the economic kind related to products and manufactures. You may learn about customs and history and government. And language itself is really a social study, for language is a part of a people's culture, and culture and society are inseparable.

And in a good Latin class you will learn a good deal about the geography of Italy and the Mediterranean area, along with some political science and quite a little history. Your teacher will be able to show you how the constitution of the United States was shaped by men who had before them the constitution of the Roman republic as a model, and how the Declaration of Independence was composed by a man who was thoroughly steeped in classical learning, whose thinking was as much classical as it was American.

We should remember, too, that you cannot make progress in the social sciences without studying language. The various social studies involve a lot of special words. If you already know these words—if you know what they really mean—you will have an advantage in these studies. But if you are like the student I heard of last year, who thought that the federal government had the power to levy "exercise" taxes, you will have to learn quite a few new words before you can make real progress.

Before you can understand what you hear and read about the world of today, or discuss current problems intelligently, you must know exactly what these words and others like them mean: *democracy, constitution, tolerance, community, society, justice, law, liberty, common people, rights, freedom, referendum, senate, administration, census, jurisdiction, commerce, veto.*³

In your social studies you should learn

³ Of the 18 terms in this list, 15 are derived from Latin and Greek.

² Did it ever occur to you that many words are funny noises?

something about the real meaning of these words—and your understanding will be improved along with your language.

Language and Education

A HUMAN being who lives by himself does not need any language: he has no one to talk to. If two persons live together, they need the means of communication which we call language if they are to get along. If many people live together, and if they wish to ensure the survival of their ideas and accomplishments, they must have not only language, but also writing. Sometimes language is called a "tool," but it is much more than this. A tool suggests something quite ordinary, like a monkey-wrench or a pair of pliers—as though when you needed a language, you could just pick it up from the work bench. *But a language is a great thing, a product of the mentality of a people, rich with their experience through generations of men.* To call it a "tool" is to dishonor it.

In other words, if you are to become a real American, if you are to share in the fullest degree in the rich and vital life of modern America, you must have the greatest possible command of your own language, both in reading and in writing.

No matter what line of work you follow, you will have an advantage in that work because you can read and write and speak well. By that I don't mean anything fancy: I don't mean that you should write poetry or use big words. I do mean that you should have complete mastery of language so that language can never master you.⁴

Language and Learning

How is a complete mastery of language to be acquired?

The ordinary way of learning a language is by remembering and repeating words and phrases that other people use. You know how it is with infants: grown-ups keep encouraging the youngster to say "Da-da" or "Bye-bye" and sooner or later, much to everyone's

surprise, Junior obliges by saying a totally different word that he has heard someone use! Often parents are embarrassed because Junior repeats words that he should not have learned at all!

As time goes on, the child learns by imitation to use a great many words and phrases, and at the same time, without knowing it, begins to follow some of the basic rules of grammar. By the age of eight or nine the average child who is going to school knows about 2,000 words—2,000 that he recognizes at sight and understands fairly well in one sense or another. Many adults have a vocabulary that may not be much larger, if as large. They are certainly not educated persons; in fact, their knowledge and thinking may still be on the eight- or nine-year-old level. They are not grown-up mentally.

To make intelligent use of anything, it is well to know how it works. After all, who is the better driver: a person who has no knowledge at all of how his car works, and merely pulls this or steps on that because he has been told that is the thing to do, or the person who not only knows how an automobile clutch and the ignition system work, but also understands mechanical principles in general?

In the same way, learning a language by repetition and imitation as children do is not really the study of language. You may speak correctly by imitation without knowing anything about language as it really is: a system of symbols and meanings which calls for the exercise of the highest human faculties—for full intellectual and cultural development.

To study language as language, you need to take it apart and find out how words work, what words actually mean as symbols, and how they are put together in combinations to make additional meanings. For this purpose, it is a very good idea to study another language besides English, so that you can compare the structure of the two languages and see how they both work. For this purpose Latin makes a very good second language. And when you study Latin you will not only learn something about your own language and how it works, but you will also learn something about language in general, just as when you study chemistry you will learn something

⁴ It has been shown by scientific tests that executives and other leaders have at their command an above-average vocabulary.

about science in general, even though you will not become a chemist. What is more, when you study Latin you will learn something about two great peoples who contributed to the making of modern America and the society in which we live.

What is Modern?

YOU may hear some people ask: "What good is it to learn about those old Romans and Greeks who lived two thousand years ago? What we need is to study the world of today, an age of science and progress. And what has the life of ancient Greece and Rome to do with the problems of today, with social security, with social and economic justice, with maintaining a lasting peace? Anyway, Latin is a *dead* language. No one speaks it any more."

You no doubt wish to study something up-to-date, something that has a bearing on present-day problems and current events. Here we must be sure that we understand the exact meaning of the words we are using.

What about current events? Does this mean things that are going on *now*, or happening *now*? What does *now* really mean? Actually there are just two kinds of events: those that have happened, and those that are going to happen. We cannot study events that have not yet happened; they don't exist. We may try to study what we think is going to happen, but that is really a kind of organized guessing. When we study trends in politics, or forms of institutions, or social problems, we can only study them as they *were* (according to our latest information) or *have been*—they may not be the same tomorrow or next month or next year. And the study of what has been, or was, is really the study of history.

Now let's look at history in another way. What happened five hundred years ago is obviously history. But how close to the present moment do we have to approach before the past ends and the present begins? Do you realize that what happened a second ago—or a hundredth of a second ago—is past, and a part of history?

I think you will agree that we ought to know something of the past if we are going to

understand what is going to happen in the future. This is just another way of saying that we can prepare for the future only on the basis of past experience. Of course, we can't study all of history—that would take a lifetime and much more. We have to limit ourselves to what is important, or at any rate, what we judge to be important. How are we going to tell what is important? By considering how long ago it happened? But according to that standard, everything that was reported in yesterday's newspaper—the arrests, divorces, and traffic accidents—is more important than the signing of the American Declaration of Independence, which happened a long time ago.

In studying Latin you will find out about some important things that happened a long time ago. The fact that they happened a long time ago has nothing to do with their importance or lack of it. Some of them are important because they affect the way we live today. Others are important because they are a part of collective social experience, just as the events of 1918-20 are a warning that we must not repeat old mistakes in building for a lasting peace.

Latin Alive and in Use

HOW can Latin be used and be useful? Well, first of all, if you are interested in your own language, and in how language works, the study of Latin (which involves the study of English) will help you to understand the greatest of all social tools. You will have a better understanding of the use of words. You will be dealing with meanings. You will be learning, not only about Latin, but about language in general.

Secondly, if you are interested in learning more about your own language—in making your own language more alive—you will be surprised to find that a great many English words come from Latin, some directly, others through French, and a few from Latin through Anglo-Saxon, the parent language of English. In fact, there are so many Latin words in English that it is almost impossible for even an uneducated person to avoid using them. And if you sit down to write even a simple

theme, you will be using words that come from Latin. We might almost put it this way: *you can't write English!*

The reason for this is that a long time ago the people who speak English somehow gave up much of their ability to make new words or express new ideas in their own language. In fact, at the present rate, in a few generations there will not be many pure English words remaining in our language, beyond the common everyday words. We shall be using a vocabulary borrowed largely from Latin and Greek.

As an example of how many words taken from Latin and Greek are found in the English language, suppose you try to re-write the following sentence in *pure* English (Greek and Latin derived words are in *italics*):

When in the *Course* of *human events*, it becomes *necessary* for one *people* to *dissolve* the *political* bands which have *connected* them with another, and to *assume* among the *powers* of the earth, the *separate* and *equal* station to which the *Laws of Nature* and of *Nature's God* entitle them, a *decent respect* to the *opinions* of mankind *requires* that they *declare* the *causes* which *impel* them to the *separation*.⁵

In the third place, if you are alert you will find that Latin will make the modern languages easier for you. The "Romance" languages—Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian, are really modern Latin. Long ago the people who lived in those countries spoke Latin, and gradually through the centuries the language changed, as languages will, and evolved into something new. If you understand language, and have a feeling for how it works, and have a fair knowledge of Latin words, these modern Romance or Latin-derived languages will not seem to be strange or foreign. They will be new, but they will not be foreign.

⁵ In pure English it might read something like this: "When in the path of the things that happen to mankind it comes to the place where one folk must break the 'tween-folk ties that have held them to another, and take among the strengths of the earth the other and fair place to which the laws of World-Being and the God of World-Being give them right, a fitting looking-to the thinking of mankind tells them to make known why they are forced to the breaking."

The Classics and American Culture

BUT this is by no means all that the student of Latin finds in this subject that is so inadequately named. Our way of living belongs to an old tradition that has its origin far back in history.

We believe, first of all, in democracy. This really means that the power, or the authority, by which the government acts, and by which the state is run, comes from the *demos*—the Greek word for "the people." The very fact that the great idea by which our country is governed has a Greek word-symbol suggests its origin. The Greeks were the first to establish clearly and define the principles of democracy—a society in which the people govern themselves. The Romans (who spoke Latin) added their own ideas to those of the Greeks, and together the Greeks and Romans established a body of thought, traditions, and action, that we call "Graeco-Roman" or "Classical" civilization. We cannot study Latin and the Romans without learning a good deal about their civilization, which is, in part, the foundation of our own.

The Romans believed, too, that while the power or authority by which the state is administered comes from the people, there is more to *democracy* than a *form* of government. Whether democracy is good or bad depends upon how the people exercise their power. The Greeks and Romans well knew that when a democracy is bad—that is, when the people are bad—it may result in a dictatorship or tyranny of the most brutal and bloody kind. Consequently, the Greeks and Romans believed that while the power of the state must come from the people, it must be controlled and tempered by law. A state in which the government derives its power from the people, but exercises that power according to the law, we call a "republic"—from the Latin phrase *res publica*. The United States of America is a great example of a republic founded in the tradition of Graeco-Roman political thought.

Thus we believe that the people should follow certain rules that we call "the law." Our Constitution is part of the law; so is the Bill of Rights. These laws, said the Romans,

should be based on fair and just principles—and so say we. There should be equal justice for all—and so say we; not one kind of law for one group of people, not one set of rights for one group of citizens and another set for another group.

The Greeks were the first to establish the idea of equality of law for all citizens (although, since they were pioneers, they did not see that this principle applied to all *humans*, as against all *citizens*). The Romans carried out the principle for the whole civilized world, and their greatest minds thought of one law for all men in universal brotherhood. (Are we so far ahead of the Romans in this respect?)

The Good Life for Americans

ANOTHER important idea in classical civilization was that men should live well. The Greeks and Romans felt that there was more to life than simply sleeping and eating and enjoying pleasures that, after all, are shared by animals. They said that men should have leisure for good living. And what did they mean by "good living" and the "good life"?

The answer is simple. The "good life" involves living as human beings should live, including the fullest possible exercise of the faculties that are characteristically human. When men live in this manner, they are truly good "citizens" sharing in all that society has to offer. Their lives should be well-balanced and healthy. They should not have to work excessively long hours; they should not have to worry about money or health. In ancient times, unfortunately, much of the work was done by slaves, so that a few citi-

zens might have leisure for the good life. Today more and more work is being done by mechanical slaves, by steam engines, diesel engines, electric motors, so that many can have leisure for the good life.

The "good life" includes participation to the fullest possible degree in human society—citizenship in the highest sense. The culture of modern America is perhaps the most rich and vital that the world has seen since the days of classical civilization: the person who is truly a part of this culture may live both a good and great life. American culture is the business of American education. Complete participation in culture depends upon language—the key to culture.

John, Mary, and the Great World

So, you see, there is more to studying Latin and its related subject-matter than the exhumation of a dead language. Latin is the study of language in the widest sense; it may help you a little way along the road to full participation in the good life, to citizenship in the great world of yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

All of us who teach—if we are worthy of the name of teacher—are looking toward a better world. Some of us hope to achieve it through great plans for reforming the world through education. But there can be no better world without better people. That is why I am interested in you, John and Mary, and in your education. You are people: the people of tomorrow.

This is what your high school owes you and your democracy: above all, the way to a full life and a good life—citizenship in the great world of yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

Have You Read

THE HIGH SCHOOL'S OBLIGATION TO DEMOCRACY

by Fred S. Dunham

Published in 1942 by the Classical
Association of the Middle West and South

Price 10¢

Order from the Secretary-Treasurer

BOOK REVIEWS

ARISTOTLE AND PLATO

CHERNISS, HAROLD, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and of the Academy*, Vol. 1: Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press (1944). Pp. xxvii + 610. \$5.00.

That Aristotle, brilliant pupil of a brilliant master, is both an original thinker and a debtor to Plato, has been universally acknowledged; but the nature and the extent of the debt has been in dispute. How far is he to be trusted as reporter and critic of Platonic and Academic teaching? How far does he help us to reconstruct Plato's oral teaching? Can his testimony be reconciled with the evidence of the dialogues or with other ancient evidence? Do the dialogues themselves reflect any developments of Plato's thought under the impact of early criticisms by Aristotle? Above all, is Aristotle's criticism fair, objective, and detached, or is it, consciously or unconsciously, moulded by his own system? Plato, for his part, found it difficult to deal dispassionately with Homer, whom he loved and revered, but wrote: "We must not honor a man above truth" (*Rep.* 595c). And Aristotle, constrained to criticize the theory of ideas, professed that he found his task difficult, in that the theory had been introduced by "friends"; nevertheless "it will perhaps seem best, at least when the truth is at stake, to go so far as to sacrifice what is near and dear to us, especially as we are philosophers. For friends and truth are both dear to us, but it is a sacred duty to prefer the truth" (*E. N.* 1096a11-17). I still recall the electric moment, now more than thirty years ago, when in an Oxford lecture-room F. C. S. Schiller reached this point in the text of the *Ethics* and paused to remark: "Shameless plagiarism! 'Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk'" [*Exodus* 23. 19].

Professor Cherniss, who has already shown his acumen in this kind of investigation in his *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (1935), now brings out the first of two elaborate volumes which will round out his under-

taking. His "Foreword" (ix-xxvi), a model of succinct recapitulation, reviews the vast controversial literature of the past century and more that deals with this problem. His own contribution, which follows, is in method and achievement more comprehensive than any single previous attempt. Although the scholars with whom he feels compelled to disagree, or their champions, will doubtless challenge his argument with regard to details, the main trend of his discussion, and the conclusions toward which it points, seem likely to stand. The conclusions, to be sure, are not always easy to disentangle from the argument; and it is to be hoped that they will emerge more clearly in the second volume, to which is relegated also the fuller discussion of various problems (especially that of the Academic "number-theories," and Aristotle's criticism of "the good"), along with complete indices of passages. The trend of the present volume, however, is clear. Following in general the order of the systematic topics in Aristotle's own treatment, and therefore ranging through the logical treatises, the *Physics*, the *De Caelo*, and the *Metaphysics*, with frequent use of many other works both Aristotelian and Platonic, and ancient and modern philosophical works in general, Cherniss presses relentlessly toward his goal. This is not the place, nor have I space, to examine in detail the mass of material and argument; it must suffice to indicate briefly the nature of the major problems, and here and there to quote some of the comments in which Cherniss sets forth his own interpretations.

Chapter 1: Diaresis, Definition, and Demonstration. Aristotle rejects the theory of ideas, by "developing the inconsistencies in the ideas viewed at once as transcendental existence and immanent essence" (5). The hypothesis of transcendental ideas "destroys the possibility of diaresis and definition" (40). Diaresis becomes for Aristotle "a serviceable instrument for establishing definitions and

the basis for classification of natural kinds"; but dichotomy proves useless for classifying a genus, since it "may err by cutting across similarities which . . . happen not to have . . . a conventional class term" (48 f.). The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence both resembles and differs from Aristotle's doctrine of recognition of the universal in the particular in the inductive method (71), and his conception of the *nous* as the "answer to Plato's objections to the inadequacy of the mechanistic psychology" (79). So far it appears that Aristotle ignores certain variations of Academic theory, and is more interested in criticizing "general philosophical attitudes." And Cherniss indicates the significance for his later chapters of this frontal attack on the theory of ideas: it somewhat arbitrarily equates the idea with the "formal cause," because Aristotle "can find nothing else in Academic theory to correspond to this element in his own system"; and Aristotle argues that "the idea as at once transcendent and immanent is a self-contradiction" (80-82).

Chapter II: The Material Substrate. Aristotle's own conceptions of "persistent substrate," "form," "privation," and "contraries" influence his account of Plato's "receptacle," the "great-and-small," "non-being," the "indefinite dyad," the "infinite," on the one hand, and Plato's ideas on the other hand (86 ff.). Attention is called to Aristotle's misinterpretation of what he regards as Platonic "matter" (conceived as the "contrary" of the ideas) as absolute "non-being," which in turn he wrongly identifies with the "receptacle" (95 f.); similarly he misinterprets "non-being" as "the false" (97-101); and he is confused in his discussion of "space" and "place" (112-123). The results of a searching examination of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's physical theories (the construction of matter on mathematical principles, indivisibility, the continuity of extension, quantitative and qualitative difference, etc.) are summed up (172 f.): again it proves to be Aristotle's desire to find his own "contraries" in the doctrines of his predecessors that leads him to lay a heavy hand on the delicately poised constructions of his master.

Chapter III: Form and Its Relation to

Matter. The discrepancies between Aristotle's accounts (*Met. A* and *M*) of the origin of the theory of ideas, and of ideas as numbers, and the ambiguities in the account of the rôles of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and the Academy, are explained as caused by Aristotle's reworking of his own materials. He holds everywhere, however, that the Platonic ideas "were meant to have a real existence separate from all phenomena"; and here "all the evidence supports Aristotle" (206; 208). His error, if there is one, is in his interpretation of the consequences of such a separation (211). Now the "eternity" of the ideas is vindicated not only by the requirements of epistemology (the possibility of knowledge, which cannot be of changing sensibilia), but also by the ontological necessity of entities not involved in change (211-218). The latter, however, Aristotle does not consistently grant Plato, though there are analogues to it in his own doctrines of form, of planetary movers, and of God; what stands in the way is his own conception of substance (218-222). In fact, Aristotle is opposed not so much to the theory of ideas as to the kinds of arguments by which the Platonists proved their existence (223-318). He tends "to refute the Platonists generally by developing an inconsistency between the doctrines of different 'sects'" (259; cf. 285). Or he ignores particular arguments, when he pleases; thus Plato knew the "third man argument" but did not think it invalidated the theory of ideas ("because idea and particular cannot be treated as homogeneous members of a multiplicity," 298); Aristotle, who must have known this, does not acknowledge Plato's position. But his chief weapon against the ideas is his own notion of "substance" (315).

"Aristotle holds that the ideas are self-contradictory because they are at once universals and definite units; but he can support this objection only by limiting universality to the extension of the common term and at the same time making of universal and particular a strict alternative. Yet, just as he finds this restricted sense of universal inadequate for his own system, so he cannot consistently maintain that the particular is the true individual."

In his ethical system, too, Aristotle's doctrine is open to precisely the objections that he levels against Plato; his "perfect substance exhibits the very characteristics which he contends prevents the ideas from being substantial entities" (364).

As to the relation of ideas and particulars, Aristotle contends that even if the existence of the ideas be granted, they could contribute nothing to any sensible object; for Plato's metaphors, he holds, are meaningless (376-389). Moreover, Plato's "soul" is no real "self-mover" (389 ff.). But the argument against the moving soul of the *Timaeus* is not valid if Aristotle is mistaken in taking the soul there described to be a magnitude rotating in space (411); whereas Plato indeed holds primary motion to be supra-physical (413). In fact, Aristotle's interpretation of the *Timaeus* (e.g. as to time and eternity) is throughout over-literal (414-431). When he implies that Plato is inconsistent in his theory of motion, he is mistaken; for Plato in all periods holds to the causality of soul, and generally to soul as self-motion, the principle of all motion, and to the idea of motion. "The ideas, then, are for Plato the ultimate and eternal realities in reference to which as models soul produces motion and change in the phenomenal world" (453). Cherniss takes note (454) of Aristotle's "startling" apparent denial of any final cause

in Plato's philosophy, "in part the result of his literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*, in part . . . evidence of careless reading or forgetfulness." Aristotle's criticism that Plato made the essence of the good not goodness but unity is to be appraised in the later volume, along with the evidence for the doctrine of idea-numbers; but it is briefly considered here, and shown to be quibbling (460) and inconsistent with Aristotle's own doctrine and use of metaphor (461-478). Eleven valuable appendices (479-610) supplement and conclude the present volume.

The task of exhibiting the failings of a great man is not a gracious one; but we have been warned on high authority that it is a sacred duty to prefer the truth even to friends. Professor Cherniss therefore deserves gratitude for the logic and painstaking erudition with which he is performing his task. If *errare est humanum*, Aristotle now emerges as a more human figure than before; and if he was resolved not *errare cum Platone*, the way is being cleared (after some possibly debatable matters in the argument have been settled) for a more just appreciation of the two masters of those who know, who were, after all, more akin in their thinking than the younger man would readily admit.

WILLIAM C. GREENE

Harvard University

THE HARRY DE FOREST SMITH SCHOLARSHIP

For students in Greek, in their senior year at high school, Amherst College offers a freshman scholarship of four hundred and fifty dollars, to be awarded on the basis of a competitive examination. The examination this year will be held on March 8 in each of the schools where there are one or more candidates for the scholarship. An announcement of the man who stands first in the examination will be made on or before March 24. The actual award will be made at the time when the successful competitor is notified of his admission to Amherst College. The holder of the scholarship will be required to take one of the regular courses in the Department of

Greek during his freshman year. The examination is so arranged that students offering only two years of Greek are in no way handicapped.

Candidates for this scholarship must take the April Scholastic Aptitude and Achievement Tests, for which application must be made before March 16 (March 9 west of the Mississippi). Each candidate must secure from the Director of Admissions at Amherst College information as to which parts of the Achievement Test he is required to take. He must also file application for admission to Amherst College not later than April 1.